A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction by Zeigler, Donald H
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters
1983
A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light
of the Legislative History of Reconstruction
Donald H. Zeigler
New York Law School, donald.ziegler@nyls.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment
Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
1983 Duke L.J. 987 (1983)
Citation: 1983 Duke L.J.  987 1983 
Provided by: 
New York Law School<br>The Mendik Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Sun Aug 13 09:13:06 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
A REASSESSMENT OF THE YOUNGER




Recently the Supreme Court extended the doctrine of Younger v. Har-
ris to preclude federal court reform of state criminal and civil justice
systems. In this article, Professor Zeigler argues that Younger and its
progeny directly contravene the intent of the Reconstruction Congresses
that adopted thefourteenth amendment and enacted numerouspieces of
enforcement legislation. His research demonstrates that these Con-
gresses intended thefederal courts to be theprimary enforcer of Recon-
struction reform measures. Professor Ziegler concludes that thefederal
courts are neglecting their duty to enforce constitutional safeguards in
state justice systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal courts have generally refused to entertain suits seeking
reform of state criminal and civil justice systems brought pursuant to
the fourteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This "uncharacteris-
tic remedial timidity"' is attributable in part to the Burger Court's far-
reaching extension of the traditional doctrine that forbids a federal
court from enjoining a pending state criminal proceeding in the ab-
sence of special circumstances. 2 The Court signaled the reemergence of
* Professor of Law, Pace University. A.B., Amherst College, 1966; J.D., Columbia
University, 1969.
The author wishes to thank Paul Dimond, Donald L. Doernberg, and Judge James D.
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also gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Kendra Golden, Sari Jaffe, and Scott
Westervelt.
1. Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J.
1035, 1036 (1977). The federal courts have been active in reforming other state institutions, such
as schools and prisons. See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
2. This doctrine reflects a "judicially developed policy of self-restraint" and combines
"principles of comity, equity, and federalism." Zeigler,.4n Accomodation ofthe Younger Doctrine
and the Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal Pro-
cess, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 266, 269-70 (1976).
The Supreme Court first addressed the propriety of federal court intervention in state crimi-
nal proceedings in In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 209-10, 219-20 (1888), and declined to intervene.
The Court has taken a flexible approach to this form of abstention over the years. "During periods
of judicial activism, the doctrine has been read narrowly and sometimes ignored, only to be reas-
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this nonintervention doctrine in 1971 in Younger v. Harris.3 It soon
extended Younger, first to bar an injunction against state-initiated civil
proceedings "in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes, ' ' 4 and
then to bar interference with any state-initiated civil proceedings.
5 Si-
multaneously, the Court expanded Younger to preclude cases request-
ing systemic reform of state practices and procedures, even though the
plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin any pending state court proceedings.
6
The lower federal courts followed the Supreme Court's lead,7 and by
the late 1970's the vast area of state administration of justice was effec-
tively free of direct federal court scrutiny under the fourteenth amend-
ment and section 1983.8
The thesis of this article is that the federal courts' refusal to use
their equitable powers to reform state justice systems directly contra-
venes the intent of the Reconstruction Congresses that adopted the
fourteenth amendment and enacted section 1983. The federal courts
serted during periods of judicial restraint." Zeigler, supra, at 270. For a review of the historical
development of the Younger doctrine, see id at 269-83; Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal
Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 740 (1974); Whitten, Federal Declaratory and
Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial
Discretion, 53 N.C.L. REv. 591 (1975).
There has been some disagreement among scholars whether to call the Younger doctrine a
type of abstention. For purposes of this article the term "Younger abstention" will be used, which
is consistent with recent Supreme Court usage. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976). Federal court reluctance to reform state justice
systems also is attributable to a separate abstention doctrine first articulated in Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498-501 (1941). This article, however, will not address either Pull-
man abstention or the abstention doctrines articulated in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315,
317-18, 327-34 (1943), Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959), Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1959), and Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-20 (1976).
3. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, the Court refused to entertain a first amendment chal-
lenge to California's Criminal Syndicalism Act, and thus reversed a lower court decision that had
enjoined Harris's prosecution under that Act. Id at 40-41. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971), decided the same day as Younger, refused to permit federal declaratory relief, which "has
virtually the same practical impact as a formal injunction." Id at 72.
4. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
5. Cf. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 & n.8, 424 (1979) (policy of noninterference in
proceedings involving important state interests); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443-44
(1977) (policy of noninterference in state enforcement proceedings).
6. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377-80 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500
(1974); infra notes 236-60, 278-97 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 330-46 and accompanying text.
8. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 1038-41; Zeigler, supra note 2, at 266-67. Fed-
eral court review of state court decisions involving alleged denials of federal rights by state justice
officials remains available through two main channels. Final judgments involving federal rights
rendered by the highest state court "in which a decision could be had" may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). And, after exhausting state remedies, individual
state criminal defendants may raise federal constitutional challenges to their convictions by way of
federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
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frequently refer to the legislative history of these Reconstruction meas-
ures for guidance in determining the provisions' proper scope and ap-
plication.9 Younger and its progeny, however, rarely mention the
legislative history,'0 perhaps because equitable restraint finds no sup-
port there. Most of the voluminous scholarly commentary on the
Younger doctrine does not address the legislative intent of either the
fourteenth amendment or section 1983."l This article fills that void.
Section II addresses the legislative history of Reconstruction. It
begins with a brief discussion of the relevance of legislative intent in
constitutional and statutory interpretation. It then proceeds to a de-
tailed review of the legislative history of Reconstruction from 1865 to
1871. This review presents a new perspective on congressional con-
cerns and purposes during that era. The record shows that Congress's
primary concern was the continuing violence and maladministration of
justice in the South. Congress's main purpose in passing the fourteenth
amendment and in enacting wave after wave of enforcement legislation
was to accomplish a systemic reform of southern criminal and civil jus-
tice systems. 12 The record further shows that the federal courts were to
9. See infra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
10. In many Younger cases the majority opinion makes no mention of the legislative history
of the Reconstruction enactments, despite plaintiffs' reliance on the fourteenth amendment and
section 1983. See, e.g., the "Younger sextet": Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82
(1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); see also
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Wooley v. May-
nard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975);
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
The majority does refer to the legislative history in a general way to support its decision not
to abstain in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463-65 (1974). References to the legislative his-
tory are found more frequently in dissenting or concurring opinions. See, e.g., Trainor v. Her-
nandez, 431 U.S. at 450, 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. at 339 n.2 (Stevens,
J., concurring); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. at 355-56 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. at 616-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. at 106-07 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 61-63 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
11. Douglas Laycock briefly discusses the legislative history of section 1983 as it relates to
abstention in Federal Intererence with State Prosecutions: The Needfor Prospective Relief, 1977
Sup. CT. REV. 193, 232-34. He concludes that the legislative history does not support abstention.
Id
12. Recent studies of the legislative history of the Reconstruction enactments have centered
on the historical justification for desegregation, extension of voting rights, and incorporation of
the Bill of Rights in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See R. BERGER, GOV-
ERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 5 (1977); see also Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 14
CONN. L. REv. 237 (1982); Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered- The Segregation Ques-
tion, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1049 (1956); Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, The 'Right"to Vote,
andthe Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 33. Although the legisla-
DUKE LAWJOURo8AL
be the primary enforcers of this program through substantial interven-
tion in the day-to-day workings of southern justice systems. Congress
firmly and repeatedly rejected the notion that the federal courts should
stay their hand in favor of theoretically available, but demonstrably
ineffective, state court remedies.
Section III examines the Younger doctrine in light of the legisla-
tive history of Reconstruction, and concludes that Younger and its
progeny are wholly inconsistent with the congressional purposes. The
legislative history contains specific and repeated commands to the fed-
eral courts to intervene when state criminal and civil justice systems fail
to protect fundamental rights. Thus, by declining to exercise jurisdic-
tion, the federal courts neglect their duty to ensure that state justice
systems function in a manner consistent with the requirements of the
federal constitution. Section III also explains briefly the inconsistency
between the Younger doctrine and the Supreme Court cases refusing to
require exhaustion of state remedies in section 1983 cases.
II. A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
RECONSTRUCTION
A. The Relevance of Legislative Intent.
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the importance of
legislative intent' 3 in construing the fourteenth amendment and the Re-
construction legislation conferring jurisdiction and prescribing reme-
dies.' 4 In recent years, the Court has canvassed and recanvassed the
legislative debates on section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 187115 to de-
termine whether government officials are immune from suit in section
tive debates addressed all these topics, the predominant topic throughout Reconstruction was the
maladministration of southern justice.
13. The debate between those who would interpret constitutional provisions and remedial
statutes to reflect evolving norms and values and those who would limit application of such meas-
ures to matters contemplated by their framers has been rekindled in recent years. See, eg., R.
BERGER, supra note 12; J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
(1980); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Although the author is inclined to the former,
noninterpretivist, position, this article will meet the more exacting requirements of the latter, inter-
pretivist, viewpoint.
14. For example, the Supreme Court has examined the legislative history of the fourteenth
amendment to determine whether Congress intended to make the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
applicable to the states. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70, 72 (1947) (Black, J., dissent-
ing). A review of that history also played a role in the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954). See R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 117-33; Bickel, supra note 12, at
1-2; see also Kush v. Rutledge, 103 S. Ct. 1483, 1483-88 (1983) (examining the Reconstruction
period legislative debates to determine the reach of jurisdictional and remedial statutes of that
era).
15. Section 1 is currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (Supp. V 1981) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. V 1981). For the text of these sections, see infra note 165.
[Vol. 1983:987
Vol. 1983:987] REASSESSING YOUNGER DOCTRINE 991
1983 actions,' 6 whether states and municipalities are persons within the
meaning of the statute,' 7 and whether section 1983 is an exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act.'8 In its 1982 term, the Court also determined
legislative history decisive when it declined to require exhaustion of
state administrative remedies in section 1983 actions:
[L]egislative purpose... is of paramount importance in the exhaus-
tion context because Congress is vested with the power to prescribe
the basic procedural scheme under which claims may be heard in
federal courts .... [T]he initial question whether exhaustion is re-
quired should be answered by reference to congressional intent; and
a court should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a federal
statute unless it is consistent with that intent.' 9
If the legislative history of the Reconstruction era is crucial to determi-
nation of these issues, it seems equally relevant in determining whether
the federal courts may properly decline to exercise jurisdiction in cases
brought pursuant to the fourteenth amendment and section 1983.
16. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Lahue, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 1116-18 (1983); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 242-44 (1974).
17. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-43 (1979) (holding that states are not persons).
Compare Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664-90 (1978) (holding
that municipalities are persons) with Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-91 (1961) (holding that
they are not). The Court also considered the legislative history of section 1983 in determining that
municipalities were not entitled to a good-faith defense, see Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 635-38 (1980), and that punitive damages could not be assessed against them, see City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981) ("It is by now well settled that the tort
liability created by § 1983 cannot be understood in a historical vacuum.").
18. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240-42 (1972). The Court also reviewed the legislative
history of section 1983 in determining that the statute "encompasses claims based on purely statu-
tory violations of federal law," Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 (1980), and that negligence is
actionable under section 1983, see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534-35, 544 (1981). But see
Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (Court questioned whether alleged fail-
ure of state officials to provide adequate "assurances" to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services that the "human rights" of retarded persons were protected, as required by federal stat-
ute, constituted a denial of a right secured by the law of the United States within the meaning of
section 1983).
19. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1982). Abstention is conceptually similar
to exhaustion, because abstention forces the federal plaintiff to exhaust state judicial remedies
before turning to federal courts for relief. Patsy thus provides particularly strong support for
examining the abstention doctrine in light of the legislative history of the Reconstruction era. See
infra note 349.
Recent cases restricting federal court discretion to imply private rights of action to remedy
violations of federal statutes are consistent with the Court's approach in Patsy because they reaf-
firm the importance of congressional intent. In deciding whether to imply a cause of action under
a statute that does not explicitly create one, the Court appears to have moved from the four-factor
test of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), to a single-factor test of legislative intent. See Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) ("our task is limited solely to determining
whether Congress intended to create [a] private right of action"). But see California v. Sierra
Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981) (suggesting that although the ultimate issue is legislative intent, the
Cort factors remain the criteria for discerning that intent).
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B. The Legislative History of Reconstruction.
One embarks on a journey through the legislative history of the
Reconstruction era with a certain caution, for previous travelers have
seen a countryside as different as the Rocky Mountains and the plains
of Kansas.20 The journey will of necessity be a long one because the
legislative debates of many years must be reviewed.2 1 The constitu-
tional amendments and statutes passed during Reconstruction are in-
terrelated. Therefore, they cannot be treated as self-contained units
and interpreted without reference to other measures enacted during the
period. Finally, it is imperative to review with some care the evils Con-
gress sought to redress for guidance in deciding "what current condi-
tions closely resemble the historic wrongs that may have led to the
passage of a given provision."2 2 Fortunately, the Reconstruction legis-
lators dwelt at length on the evils they sought to cure.
1. Presidential Reconstruction and the Black Codes. The Recon-
struction program of President Johnson immediately following the
Civil War, along with the South's enactment of the Black Codes, set the
stage for congressional reconstruction. President Johnson viewed re-
construction as an executive function.23 With Congress out of session,
he moved quickly in the summer and fall of 1865 to restore the south-
ern states to the Union.24 Unfortunately, the President "let the spoils
control the victor."25 President Johnson appointed provisional gover-
nors for the southern states, 26 but instructed the governors to give state
residents a relatively free hand in forming new governments. 27 Consti-
20. Compare, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 12 with Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial
Review of Racial Discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause." Meeting Raoul Berger on Inter-
pretivist Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REV. 462, 463 (1982) and Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights" A Critique
ofRaoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651 (1979).
21. As Raoul Berger has reminded investigators, "it is not enough to [state] that the evidence
is overwhelming. It is necessary to pile proof on proof, even at the risk of tedium, so that the
reader may determine for himself whether it is overwhelming or inconclusive." R. BERGER, supra
note 12, at 8.
22. Dimond, supra note 20, at 472; see also J. ELY, supra note 13, at 13.
23. J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 559-60 (2d ed.
1961); see also 2 J. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS 70 (1886).
24. J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note 23, at 558.
25. H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 315 (1982).
26. 2 J. BLAINE, supra note 23, at 78-80; J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note 23, at 562.
27. See, e.g., E. MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 11-12 (De Capo Press ed. 1972) (reprinting the procla-
mation establishing procedures for the reconstruction of North Carolina). The provisional gover-
nors generally retained existing state officials in office. J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note 23,
at 562. Moreover, the "[diecrees of the state courts in ordinary civil and criminal matters were
confirmed." Id
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tutional conventions called by the provisional governors were domi-
nated by the white power structure that had controlled the South
during the war,28 and delegates "exhibited a remarkable indifference to
Northern opinion. ' 29 In due course elections were held for state and
local offices and for Congress.30 All those elected were white,31 and
many were former confederate offcials.
32
The freedmen did not fare well under the new regimes. Carl
Schurz, who toured the South from July to October, 1865, at the Presi-
dent's request, reported that former slaveowners sought effectively to
reenslave the blacks by widespread intimidation and violence.33 In ad-
dition, between November, 1865 and March, 1866, the newly-elected
legislatures in all of the ex-Confederate states except Texas and Arkan-
sas enacted comprehensive laws34 regulating the freedmen. These
Black Codes35 controlled and disciplined farm laborers by prohibiting
"vagrancy" 36 and desertion from work.37 Children were to be forcibly
apprenticed. 38 Freedmen were forbidden to engage in certain occupa-
tions without obtaining a license,39 and freedom of movement was cur-
tailed.40 Freedmen were not allowed to carry weapons. 41 Other
provisions regulated general conduct and etiquette toward whitds.42
28. 2 J. BLAINE, supra note 23, at 80-81.
29. J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note 23, at 57 1.
30. H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 25 at 304; J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note
23, at 562-63.
31. H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 25, at 304.
32. J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note 23, at 571.
33. Report of Carl Schurz on the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississopi and
Louisiana, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-20 (1865).
34. C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, PART ONE, at 106-07 (1971).
35. For a compilation of the Black Codes, see Howard, Laws in Relation to Freedmen, S.
EXEC. Doc. No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 170-230 (1867). An almost verbatim recitation of the
Codes is presented in E. MCPHERSON, supra note 27, at 29-44. See generally D. NOVAK, THE
WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK FORCED LABOR AFTER SLAVERY (1978); T. WILSON, THE BLACK
CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965); F. WOOD, BLACK SCARE: THE RACIST RESPONSE TO EMANCIPA-
TION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1968).
36. See, e.g., S. ExEc. Doc. No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 170-71 (Alabama), 192-93 (Missis-
sippi), 218-19 (South Carolina), 229-30 (Virginia) (1867).
37. See, e.g., id at 181-82 (Louisiana), 193-95 (Mississippi).
38. See, e.g., id at 172-74 (Alabama), 180-81 (Georgia), 186 (Louisiana), 187-88 (Maryland),
190-91 (Mississippi), 200-02 (North Carolina), 209-11 (South Carolina).
39. A South Carolina law enacted December 21, 1865, for example, provided that no black
could be an artisan, mechanic, or shopkeeper, or pursue any other business except farm laborer or
servant, without first obtaining a license from a judge of the district court. A fee was required, and
the license could be revoked at any time if complaints were made. Id at 215.
40. The Mississippi "Civil Rights" Act of November 25, 1865 required that a freedman be
able to show written evidence of a lawful home and employment in the form of a "license" from
the mayor of a town or board of police. Id at 194; see also id at 205 (South Carolina).
41. See, e.g., id at 174 (Florida), 183 (Louisiana), 195-96 (Mississippi), 204 (South Carolina).
42. See, e.g., id at 174 (Florida), 196 (Mississippi).
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The framers of the Black Codes envisioned that the southern crim-
inal justice system would be the primary enforcement mechanism. In-
deed, the Codes bristled with harsh criminal sanctions.43 In some
states, new courts were created to handle the expected flow of cases,
44
while in others the jurisdiction of existing courts or officials was
enlarged.
45
Although the Codes generally were racially discriminatory on
their face, some provisions contained no reference to race,46 or pur-
ported to apply equally to blacks and whites.47 The facially neutral
provisions normally were confined to blacks in their application,48 but
43. For example, under Florida's vagrancy statute, every able-bodied person who had "no
visible means of living" and was unemployed could be arrested by any justice of the peace or
judge of the county criminal court. E. MCPHERSON, supra note 27, at 39. If the defendant could
not give "sufficient surety" of future industry, he was subject to trial. Upon conviction, he could
be sentenced to labor or to prison for up to one year. If sentenced to labor, the sheriff or court
officer was to hire out the defendant. Id According to the Mississippi Code, laborers who quit the
service of their employers before the end of the term without good cause forfeited wages earned
up to that time. S. ExEc. Doc. No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 193-94 (1867). Upon the affidavit of an
employer that a freedman had illegally deserted his job, a justice of the peace or member of the
board of police was authorized to issue an arrest warrant. Id at 195. Upon returning the absent
black, a policeman or private party was to be paid five dollars plus mileage. Similarly, the Missis-
sippi child apprenticeship law required all sheriffs, justices of the peace, and other officers to
report to probate courts all black children whose parents could not support them so that the court
could apprentice the children to a suitable person. Id at 190. The former owner of the children
was given a preference. Id If an apprentice left without the master's consent, the child could be
forcibly brought before a justice of the peace. A continuing refusal to return could result in a jail
sentence. Id at 190-91.
44. In Alabama, a county court was established for the trial of misdemeanors. E. MCPHER-
SON, supra note 27, at 34. In South Carolina, district courts were established having exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil cases where one or both parties were black and of all criminal cases where
the accused was black. S. EXEC. Doc. No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 206 (1867). In Florida, a county
criminal court was created by the Act of January 11, 1866 to hear various charges, including
malicious mischief, vagrancy, and all misdemeanors. E. MCPHERSON, supra note 27, at 38. In an
apparent attempt to achieve the sort of assembly-line efficiency that characterizes today's big-city
arraignment sessions, the Act provided that "no presentment, indictment, or written pleadings
shall be required." Id
45. In Alabama, justices of the peace were given jurisdiction over offenses such as vagrancy,
larceny, and assault where no weapon was used. E. MCPHERSON, supra note 27, at 34. Missis-
sippi's vagrancy act gave justices of the peace, mayors, and aldermen jurisdiction to try vagrancy
questions. S. ExEc. Doc. No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 192 (1867).
46. Georgia's vagrancy law, for example, applied to "all persons" able to work and having no
visible and known means of support. E. MCPHERSON, supra note 27, at 33. A new Alabama penal
code made no distinction on account of race. Id at 34.
47. Mississippi's vagrancy law applied not only to freedmen, but also to all white persons
assembling with freedmen or usually associating with them. S. EXEC. Doc. No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d
Sess. 192 (1867).
48. 2 J. BLAINE, supra note 23, at 97-98; see also Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting
Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State
Court Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 815-16 (1965); Dimond, supra note 20, at 474-75.
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some were aimed at whites serving in the Union Army or the Freed-
men's Bureau49 who sought to aid the freedmen.
50
2. The Thirty-Ninth Congress, First Session. The pent-up frustra-
tion caused by President Johnson's ineffectual Reconstruction program
and the Black Codes burst forth in Congress when it finally convened
on December 4, 1865. By prearranged plan,51 newly-elected represent-
atives from the rebel states were not allowed to take their seats in the
House.52 Also by prearrangement, Thaddeus Stevens, the leader of
House Republicans, 53 submitted a resolution calling for creation of a
joint committee of fifteen House and Senate members to inquire into
conditions in the South and to consider appropriate legislation. 54 The
resolution passed overwhelmingly.
55
In the days that followed, a steady stream of bills, resolutions, and
proposed constitutional amendments concerning Reconstruction
flowed into the legislative hopper.56 The Black Codes and the malad-
ministration of southern criminal and civil justice were primary con-
49. The Freedmen's Bureau was created by an Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507, to
aid blacks in making the transition to freedom. The Bureau sought to find employment for blacks,
and often mediated in contractual disputes with the freedmen's former owners. The Bureau also
ran a system of special courts in an attempt to secure fair treatment for freedmen. See 2 J.
BLAINE, supra note 23, at 162-65; J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note 23, at 576-77; tenBroek,
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution ofthe United States: Consummation to Abolition and Key
to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 171, 184 (1951). Congress's attempt to enlarge
the Bureau and extend its jurisdiction is discussed infra at notes 64-79 and accompanying text. See
generally D. NIEMAN, To SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMAN'S BUREAU AND THE LEGAL
RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868 (1979).
50. Many codes, for example, prescribed criminal penalties for inducing a freedman to leave
his employer. See, e.g., S. ExEc. Doc. No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 171-72 (Alabama), 177 (Flor-
ida), 185 (Louisiana), 195 (Mississippi), 227 (Virginia) (1867). In addition, hundreds of white
southerners used Code provisions to bring civil suits against Army and Bureau personnel for
interfering with blacks' labor contracts and for other alleged wrongs. H. HYMAN, A MORE PER-
FECT UNION 452-53 (1973); H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 25, at 322-23.
51. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 34, at 117; B. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 142 (1914).
52. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-4 (1865). The southern congressional delegations
included many men who had held high civilian or military positions under the Confederacy. See
W. HESSELTINE, CONFEDERATE LEADERS IN THE NEw SOUTH 93-147 (1950).
53. J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note 23, at 568.
54. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1865).
55. Id The Joint Committee played a central role in the Thirty-Ninth Congress. The four-
teenth amendment was drafted and revised in its meetings. The Committee's creation and pro-
ceedings have been examined in detail by many scholars. See, e.g., C. FAIRMAN, supra note 34, at
118-24, 131-33, 1207-1300; B. KENDRICK, supra note 51, at 137-47.
The opening session of the Senate also focused on Reconstruction. Senator Sumner intro-
duced nine separate measures on the subject, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1865), and
Senator Wilson introduced a bill specifically to outlaw the Black Codes, id at 39.
56. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 10, 14, 69, 84-87 (1865).
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cerns.57 Some legislators sought immediate action on these problems,5 8
but the Senate leadership wanted more time, both to allow the thir-
teenth amendment with its enforcement provision to become effective5 9
and to develop comprehensive measures in committee.60
On January 5, 1866, Senator Lyman Trumbull, the chairman of
the Judiciary Committee, introduced two related bills.6 ' The first, the
Freedmen's Bureau bill, was designed to enlarge the powers of the Bu-
reau. The second, the Civil Rights bill, sought to "protect every indi-
vidual in the full enjoyment of the rights of person and property. ' 62
Key provisions of both bills were specifically directed at the Black
Codes and the pervasive discrimination against freedmen and white
loyalists in southern justice systems.63
(a). The Freedmen's Bureau Bill. Section 7 of the Freedmen's Bu-
reau bill declared that whenever in any of the rebel states,
in consequence of any State or local law, ordinance, police or other
regulation, custom or prejudice, any of the civil rights or immunities
belonging to white persons, including the right to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence,. . . and to have full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of per-
son and estate ... are refused or denied to negroes ... on account
of race ... or wherein they ... are subjected to any other or differ-
ent punishment ... for the commission of any act or offence than
57. See, e.g., id at 10 (remarks of Rep. Stevens), 14 (Rep. Bingham), 39-42 (Sen. Wilson), 91-
98 (Sen. Sumner).
58. On December 13, Senator Wilson urged immediate passage of his bill to outlaw the Black
Codes. Id at 39-42. On December 20, Senator Sumner gave a lengthy speech urging quick enact-
ment of Wilson's bill. Because the Black Codes were enforced in the southern court system, Sena-
tor Sumner also proposed taking virtually all cases in which blacks were parties out of the local
and state courts and vesting exclusive jurisdiction over such cases in the federal courts. Such cases
were to be regarded as arising under the Constitution of the United States. Id at 91. This provi-
sion, although not enacted, demonstrated Congress's frustration with the workings of the southern
courts and its willingness to have the federal courts intervene to help remedy the problem.
59. Id at 41 (remarks of Sen. Sherman), 43 (Sen. Trumbull). The thirteenth amendment
became effective on December 18, 1865. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 34, at 1161.
60. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 42-43,77 (1865) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull). Trum-
bull believed that such legislation was appropriate under the enforcement clause of the thirteenth
amendment. Id
61. Id at 129 (1866). The day began with Senator Sumner reading a petition recounting the
continuing violence against blacks in Alabama and the abuse of the state's criminal justice system.
Id at 127.
62. Id at 77.
63. In the discussion that follows, the Freedmen's Bureau bill, the Civil Rights bill, and the
fourteenth amendment are described individually for clarity of presentation. As Harold Hyman
and William Wiecek caution, however, debates on these measures "are all but inseparable, and
contemporaries did not separate them. Indeed, attempts to do so too sharply incur the risk of
obscuring the essentials which the proponents of these measures sought." H. HYMAN & W.
WIECEK, supra note 25, at 413.
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are prescribed for white persons committing like acts ... it shall be
the duty of the President ... to extend military protection and juris-
diction over all cases affecting such persons so discriminated
against."4
Section 8 stated that any person who, under color of state law, deprived
any person of the rights secured in section 7 would be guilty of a misde-
meanor and could be punished by fine of up to $1000 or imprisonment
for up to one year, or both.65 Section 8 broadly defined the jurisdiction
of Bureau courts as follows:
[I]t shall be the duty of the officers and agents of this bureau to take
jurisdiction of, and hear and determine all offenses committed
against the provisions of this section, and also of all cases affecting
negroes. . . or other persons who are discriminated against in any of
the particulars mentioned in the preceding section of this act.
66
These provisions contemplated extensive federal intervention in
the administration of justice in the South, 67 and the debates on the bill
confirm that such intervention is precisely what Congress intended.
Proponents in both houses focused upon the evils the bill was designed
to address-the Black Codes and the maladministration of justice by
southern executive and legislative officials. 68 The federal legislators
made it clear that the bill was not limited to blacks, but extended pro-
tection to whites as well.69 Opponents strongly criticized the broad
sweep of sections 7 and 8,70 and complained that the powers granted
the Freedmen's Bureau would cause widespread conffict between the
Bureau and state court personnel. 7' Senator Trumbull stressed that the
Bureau courts were temporary, and would relinquish jurisdiction when
64. E. MCPHERSON, supra note 27, at 73-74.
65. Id at 74.
66. Id The Freedmen's Bureau bill also conferred broad grants of authority on the President
and Freedmen's Bureau officials to provide assistance to freedmen. Land was to be set aside for
them, and asylums and schools built. Id at 73. The Secretary of War was authorized to direct
emergency allocations of food, clothing, and medical supplies, and to provide shelter. Id
67. The language of sections 7 and 8 is not limited to statutory denial of rights. Section 7
proscribes discrimination not only "in consequence of any state or local law" but also by "custom
or prejudice." Section 8 allows Bureau courts to take jurisdiction of any case where a person
suffers discrimination proscribed by section 7.
68. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 340-43 (remarks of Sen. Wilson), 516-17 (Rep.
Eliot), 588-89 (Rep. Hubbard), 623, 632, 636-37 (Rep. Kelley), 652-53 (Rep. McKee) (1866).
69. For example, the bill was amended on January 22, 1866, to extend protection to Bureau
officials. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 348 (1866); see also id at 516 (remarks of Rep.
Eliot).
70. Senator Hendricks attacked sections 7 and 8 as overbroad and vague. CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., Ist Sess. 318 (1866).
71. Senator Davis stated that the "suits under this Freedmen's Bureau bill will be thick as
leaves in Vallambrosa," id at 417, and raised the spectre of state clerks and judges being impris-
oned for enforcing state laws, id at 418.
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state courts administered justice fairly and impartially.72 But he in-
sisted that intervention should continue as long as was necessary to
achieve this goal.
73
Finally, and of particular importance here, Congress specifically
and overwhelmingly rejected the concept of abstention during the de-
bates on the Freedmen's Bureau bill. Senator Davis proposed an
amendment directing Bureau officials not to exercise any judicial pow-
ers in any State in which the laws could be enforced by the civil
courts.74 The Senate rejected this amendment by a vote of 36-9. 75 The
Freedmen's Bureau bill passed both Houses overwhelmingly, 76 but
President Johnson vetoed it.77 The Senate was unable to override the
veto,78 and a revised version was passed later in the session and became
law on July 16, 1866.7
9
72. Id at 322-23, 347.
73. Id at 322-23. Trumbull expected the federal courts to furnish protection under the provi-
sions of the companion Civil Rights bill once the Bureau withdrew. Id
Opponents of the Freedmen's Bureau bill raised some compelling constitutional arguments.
Senator Davis considered the bill unconstitutional because it vested judicial power in officers of
the executive branch. Id at 415. Proponents of the bill answered such arguments by citing the
war powers and the enforcement provision of the thirteenth amendment. Id at 319-23 (remarks
of Sen. Trumbull), 631 (Rep. Moulton).
74. Id at 399.
75. Id
76. The bill passed the Senate 37-10 on January 25, id at 421, and the House 136-33 on
February 6, id at 688.
77. The President's veto message of February 19, 1866, is set forth in E. MCPHERSON, supra
note 27, at 68-72.
78. The vote on the override attempt was 30-18. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 943
(1866).
79. Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173; see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. app. 366-67 (1866). There were a number of differences between the original bill designed to
extend Bureau protections and the revised bill that eventually became law. Some of these differ-
ences were: the term of the Bureau was reduced from a period of indefinite duration, see E.
MCPHERSON, supra note 27, at 73, to a period of two years from the date of the bill's passage, 14
Stat. 173; the suggested size of the bureaucracy to administer Bureau affairs was decreased, com-
pare E. MCPHERSON, supra note 27, at 73 with 14 Stat. 174; the language specifying the types of
aid the Bureau could provide was made less inclusive, compare E. MCPHERSON, supra note 27, at
73 with 14 Stat. 174; and the civil rights to be protected were more specifically enumerated in the
revised bill, 14 Stat. 176-77, presumably in response to the overbreadth and vagueness challenges
to the original provisions. See supra note 70; E. MCPHERSON, supra note 27, at 69 (President
Johnson's veto message).
Finally, section 8 of the original bill, which would have subjected state and local officials to
criminal sanctions if they applied discriminatory laws or facially neutral laws in discriminatory
ways, see E. MCPHERSON, supra note 27, at 74, was completely dropped from the revised bill,
along with the provisions investing Bureau officials with jurisdiction to hear such charges. By the
time the revised bill was enacted in July, 1866, the companion Civil Rights bill had been passed
over President Johnson's veto. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. Because the Civil
Rights Act provided criminal sanctions for violations, under color of state law, of specifically
enumerated civil rights and invested the federal courts with jurisdiction to hear such cases, see
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(b). The Civil Rights Act. The provisions of Senator Trumbull's
proposed Civil Rights bill complemented the Freedmen's Bureau bill.
Section 1, in language that parallels section 7 of the Bureau bill,
declared
that there shall be no discrimination in civil rights ... on account of
race ... but the inhabitants of every race and color ... shall have
the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence,. . . and to full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of person and property, and shall be subject
to like punishments, pains and penalties.
80
Section 2 provided criminal penalties against any person who, under
color of state law, denied another any right secured by the bill.81 Sec-
tion 3 gave federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases
brought under section 2, and gave district and circuit courts concurrent
jurisdiction "of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are
denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State
or locality where they may be any of the rights secured to them by the
act."'8 2 Section 3 also provided that any state suit, civil or criminal,
commenced against any such person, or against any officials carrying
out the Civil Rights Act or the Freedmen's Bureau Act, could be re-
moved to federal court.
8 3
These provisions contemplated substantial federal court interven-
tion in the criminal and civil justice systems of the South to ensure fair
and impartial administration of the laws.84 Congress effectively told
infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text, section 8 of the original Freedmen's Bureau bill was no
longer necessary.
80. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1866). Section 1 was subsequently amended to
eliminate the first clause prohibiting "discrimination in civil rights." During the debate, various
Senators criticized this general reference to civil rights as vague and overbroad. Id at 477-78
(remarks of Sen. Saulsbury), 499 (Sen. Cowan), 1291 (Rep. Bingham); see Georgia v. Rachel, 384
U.S. 780, 791-92 (1965). House proponents felt that the specific enumeration of rights in section 1
was sufficient to achieve the bill's purpose and that the change would appease some House mem-
bers. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1366 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Wilson).
81. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1866).
82. Id
83. Id In discussing section 3, Senator Trumbull remarked:
[J]urisdiction is given to the Federal courts of a case affecting the person that is discrimi-
nated against. . . . [I]f [while] undertaking to enforce his right in a State court he was
denied that right, then he could go into the Federal court; but it by no means follows that
every person would have a right in the first instance to go-to the Federal court.
Id at 1759. When section 3 was recodified in 1874, the streamlined text provided only removal
jurisdiction. Revised Statutes of 1874, § 641. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 48, at 810-14.
Sections 2 and 3 were enacted without substantial amendment. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch.
31, 14 Stat. 27.
84. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1153 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Thayer)
("The bill seeks to enforce these rights in the same manner and with the same sanctions under and
by which other laws of the United States are enforced. It imposes duties upon the judicial tribu-
999
1000 DUKE LAW JOURN4L [Vol. 1983:987
southern officials that "all causes, civil and criminal," would be taken
away from them by federal courts if defendants were denied funda-
mental rights in state proceedings. Moreover, during the debates, pro-
ponents of the Civil Rights Act made clear that it was to be broadly
construed85 to combat the Black Codes and to remedy the unequal en-
forcement of the laws by southern justice officials. 86 Opponents com-
plained that the bill would work wholesale reform of state criminal
codes,8 7 interfere with the duties of state judicial 88 and executive 89 offi-
cials, and result in a flood of petty cases being removed to federal
court.90 Proponents of the measure answered that it was necessary be-
cause the judicial systems of the southern states routinely violated fun-
damental rights.9'
Some legislators bitterly opposed possible imprisonment of state
nals of the country which require the enforcement of these rights."); see also id at 605 (remarks of
Sen. Trumbull).
85. See, e.g., id at 211 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull) (The bill's purpose was "to protect all
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication."),
1152 (Rep. Thayer) (The bill was to secure for freedmen "those rights which constitute the essence
of freedom. . . those rights which secure life, liberty, and property, and which make all men
equal before the law."); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420-44 (1968); CONo.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Wilson).
86. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-75, 605, 1758-59 (remarks of Sen. Trum-
bull), 1267 (Rep. Raymond) (The Civil Rights bill "is intended to secure these citizens against
injustice that may be done them in the courts of the States within which they may reside."), 504
(Sen. Howard), 602-03 (Sen. Lane), 603 (Sen. Wilson), 1118 (Rep. Wilson), 1123-25 (Rep. Cook),
1151-53 (Rep. Thayer), 1160 (Rep. Windom), 1263 (Rep. Broomall), 1833-35 (Rep. Lawrence)
(1866); see also General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1982).
87. See, eg., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 598 (remarks of Sen. Davis) (Section 1 of
the bill "breaks down all the penal laws that inflict punishment or penalty upon all the people of
the States except so far as those laws shall be entirely uniform in their application."), 1293 (re-
marks of Rep. Bingham) (The bill proposes to "reform the whole civil and criminal code of every
State government.") (1866); see also id at 1777 (remarks of Sen. Johnson).
88. See, e.g., id at 478, 480 (remarks of Sen. Saulsbury) (The bill assures "authority over the
judicial tribunals in the administration of law in the States." In addition, "under [section 3] of the
bill ... the criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the States. . . is ousted."); see also id at 1154
(remarks of Rep. Eldridge).
89. See, e.g., id at 478 (remarks of Sen. Saulsbury), 598 (Sen. Davis), 1154 (Rep. Eldridge).
90. See, e.g., id at 479 (remarks of Sen. Saulsbury), 1778 (Sen. Johnson).
91. See the remarks of Sen. Lane:
But why do we legislate upon this subject now? Simply because we fear and have reason
to fear that the emancipated slaves would not have their rights in the courts of the slave
States ....
Here is a justice of the peace in South Carolina or Georgia, or a county court, or a
circuit court, that is called upon to execute this law. They appoint their own marshal,
their deputy marshal, or their constable, and he calls upon theposse comitalus. Neither
the judge, nor the jury, nor the officer as we believe is willing to execute the law.
Id at 602-03; see also ld at 1124 (Rep. Cook) ("It is idle to say these men will be protected by the
states."), 1833-34 (Rep. Lawrence), 1265 (Rep. Broomall).
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judges under section 2 of the bill for simply enforcing state laws,92 but
the proponents stood firm on this point.93 Senator Trumbull declared
that if state judges exhibited the requisite intent to deny the rights set
forth in section 1, or were guilty of criminal negligence, then they
could, and should, be sent to jail.94 The proponents of the bill also
made clear that whites as well as blacks were protected. 95 Congress
was especially concerned about the continuing violence against white
loyalists and northern soldiers and the ongoing harassment of these
groups in the state courts.
96
After long debate, both the House and Senate overwhelmingly ap-
proved the Civil Rights bill.97 Nevertheless, President Johnson vetoed
the bill, claiming that it intruded improperly into internal state affairs
and authorized unprecedented federal court interference with officials
in all branches of state government. 98 The sponsors of the bill empha-
sized to Congress that the federal courts should interfere with state ju-
dicial and executive officials to the extent necessary to ensure impartial
administration ofjustice.99 Congress overrode the President's veto, and
the Civil Rights bill became law on April 9, 1866.100
92. See, e.g., id at 475, 500 (Sen. Cowan), 598 (Sen. Davis), 601-02 (Sen. Hendricks), 1121
(Rep. Rogers), 1154 (Rep. Eldridge), 1267 (Rep. Raymond), 1778 (Sen. Johnson).
93. On March 9, 1866, the House specifically rejected, by a vote of 113-37, a proposed
amendment offered by Representative Bingham which would have provided a civil cause of action
rather than criminal sanctions against officials violating the Civil Rights Act. Id at 1290-91, 1296.
94. Id at 475, 1758;seeid at 1120 (remarks of Rep. Wilson); see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 503 (1974).
95. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 598 (remarks of Sen. Davis), 599, 1758
(Sen. Trumbull), 1268 (Rep. Broomall), 1833 (Rep. Lawrence) (1866).
96. See, e.g., id at 503 (remarks of Sen. Howard), 783 (Rep. Ward), 1263 (Rep. Broomall),
1617 (Rep. Moulton), 1629 (Rep. Hart), 1837-38 (Rep. Clarke), 1833 (Rep. Lawrence).
97. The Senate vote on February 2 was 33-12. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 606-07
(1866). The House vote on March 13 was 111-38. Id at 1367. On March 15, the Senate adopted
the House amendments. Id at 1413-16.
98. Id at 1679-81 (President Johnson's veto message). The President was particularly
alarmed at the prospect of large numbers of state court cases being removed to federal court. Id
at 1680.
99. See id at 1757-59 (Sen. Trumbull's point by point response to the President).
100. The Senate voted to override 33-15 on April 6, id at 1809; the House followed by a 122-
41 margin on April 9. Id at 1861. Sections 1-3 of the Civil Rights Act have been carried forward
to the present day. Section I is presently codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1976); section 2 at 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1982); and section 3 at 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1976).
Although the Supreme Court has recently acknowledged that the "principal object of the
[1866 Act] was to eradicate the Black Codes," General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania,
458 U.S. 375, 386 (1982), it has not recognized that Congress intended substantial federal court
intervention in southern criminal and civil justice systems. Justice Marshall has observed that in
the general climate of the Reconstruction era, the "1866 Civil Rights Act was not an isolated
technical statute dealing with only a narrow subject. Instead, it was an integral part of a broad
congressional scheme intended to work a major revolution in the prevailing social order." Gen-
eral Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 409-10 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissent-
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(c). The May 11, 1866Amendments to the 1863 Habeas Corpus and
RemovalAct. Congress's intent to use the federal courts for systemic
reform of state criminal and civil justice is also evident from the de-
bates on the bill to amend the Habeas Corpus and Removal Act of
1863.101 The 1863 Act'02 itself was directed at problems with the ad-
ministration of justice in the South. Section 5 authorized persons sub-
jected to state criminal or civil proceedings for acts done "under color
of any authority derived from. . . the President of the United States"
to file in the state proceeding a petition for removal to federal court. 103
This provision had been enacted in response to vexatious state criminal
and civil actions against northern soldiers for false arrest, trespass, and
other injuries.' °4 Once the petition and a bond were filed, the state
court was to "proceed no further in the cause or prosecution."' 10 5
In the spring of 1866, Congress believed that amendments were
necessary if the federal courts were successfully to "shield Army and
Bureau officers from state court harassments [and] . . . block state
judges from impeding operations of the national courts and laws."' 0 6
During the debates the legislators complained that an alarming number
of vexatious civil and criminal actions had been brought in state
courts,10 7 and that southern judges were refusing to obey the 1863
ing) (footnote omitted). A fundamental part of that revolution was broad reform of southern
justice.
101. The amending bill was reported in the House on March 13, 1866 by Representative
Cook. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1368 (1866). Senator Clark reported the bill in the
Senate on April 4, 1866. Id at 1753.
102. The measure was entitled "An Act relating to Habeas Corpus, and regulating Judicial
Proceedings in Certain Cases." Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755.
103. Id at 756.
104. See H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION 451-53; H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, SUpra note
25, at 259; Amsterdam, supra note 48, at 808-09 ("The debates on passage of this 1863 act reflect
congressional concern that federal officers could not receive a fair trial in hostile state courts, and
that . . . appellate supervision . . . would be inadequate to rectify the decisions of lower state
tribunals having the power to find the facts.").
105. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat 756. Section 5 even gave the parties the right to
remove after final judgment was rendered, and to obtain in federal court either an appeal of the
judgment or a trial de novo. Id at 757. The Supreme Court subsequently held trial de novo
unconstitutional in cases where the state verdict had been by jury. Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 274, 282 (1867).
106. H. HYMAN, supra note 104, at 471.
107. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1526 (remarks of Rep. McKee) (com-
plaining that in Kentucky 3500 suits by ex-rebels against federal officers and soldiers had been
counted on the civil and criminal dockets), 1983 (Sen. Trumbull) (complaining that "several thou-
sand suits" were pending against loyal men in Kentucky and other states), 2021 (Sen. Clark)
(noting that as "the rebel soldiers and officers are returning to their homes. . . thousands of suits
are springing up all through the land, especially where the rebellion prevailed, against the loyal
men of the country who endeavored to put the rebellion down. . . . and these rebel courts are
ready to decide against your Union men.") (1866).
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Act.'08 Some state courts had interpreted the 1863 Act to allow re-
moval only when the defendant could produce an order from the Presi-
dent.'0 9 Section 1 of the 1866 bill clarified that any order by a superior
officer was sufficient authority to warrant removal, and section 2 speci-
fied how such an order should be proved."t0 Some state courts also had
interpreted the 1863 Act to limit severely the time in which a removal
petition could be filed."' Section 3 of the 1866 bill made clear that a
petition could be filed at any time before a jury was empaneled."
l 2
Finally, in section 4 Congress attempted to put some teeth into the
1863 Act's direction that a state court should proceed no further once a
proper removal petition was filed. Section 4 provided that "all such
further proceedings shall be void. . . and all parties, judges, officers,
and other persons, henceforth proceeding thereunder. . . shall be lia-
ble in damages therefor to the party aggrieved."" 3 A damage action
could proceed in either state or federal court, and a successful plaintiff
was entitled to double costs.
114
The 1866 amendments to the 1863 Habeas Corpus and Removal
Act reveal Congress's pervasive distrust of the state courts 1 5 and its
desire to ease the way for removal of thousands of cases to federal
court." 6 The amending legislation easily passed both Houses; 117 Presi-
Harold Hyman notes that some northern officials had expected many damage actions to be
filed against Army personnel as the war ended. "But apparently no one expected the post-Appo-
mattox flood to rise as swiftly and as high as it did." H. HYMAN, supra note 104, at 452.
108. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist sess. 2063 (remarks of Sen. Clark) ("I hold in my
hand a communication from a member of the other House from Kentucky, in which he says that
all the judicial districts of Kentucky, with the exception of one, are in the hands of sympathizing
judges. They entirely disregard the act to which this is an amendment. They refuse to allow the
transfer, and proceed against these men as if nothing had taken place."), 2063 (Sen. Stewart)
(expressing fear that state judges would refuse to allow removal and arguing that state appellate
remedies were inadequate), 2054 (Sen. Wilson), 2055 (Sen. Trumbull), 1880, 2054 (further re-
marks of Sen. Clark) (1866).
109. See id at 1387 (remarks of Rep. Cook).
110. Act of May 11, 1866, ch. 80, 14 Stat. 46.
111. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1387-88 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Cook). Section
5 of the 1863 Act lent itself to restrictive interpretation by stating that the defendant "shall" file the
petition "at the time of entering his appearance in such court, or if such appearance shall have
been entered before the passage of this act, then at the next session of the court in which such suit
or prosecution is pending." Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 756.
112. Act of May 11, 1866, ch. 80, 14 Stat. 46. Section 3 also continued the provisions for
removal even after entry of final judgment. Id
113. Id
114. Id
115. See Amsterdam, supra note 48, at 823-25.
116. See supra notes 107-08.
117. The measure passed the House 112-31 on March 20, 1866, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1530 (1866), and with amendments passed the Senate 30-4 on April 20, 1866, id at 2066. A
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dent Johnson signed it into law on May 11, 1866.118
(d) The Fourteenth Amendment. While Congress was debating the
Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights bills, the Joint Committee on Re-
construction, formed at the outset of the session, 1 9 considered propos-
als for constitutional amendments.120 Section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment' 2' went through many drafts in the Joint Committee.
22
The floor debates on the different drafts generally were conducted in
lofty but vague terms.' 23 These debates contribute to the current ambi-
guity concerning precisely what deprivations of rights the fourteenth
amendment empowers Congress to remedy.'
24
Whatever else section 1 may have been designed to correct, it is
clear from the debates that the section was designed first and foremost
to correct the immediate problems caused by the Black Codes and the
maladministration of justice in the South. This is apparent from the
language Representative Bingham chose to incorporate in section 1:
"No State shall ...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
Conference Committee reached accord, id at 2303, and the Conference report was approved by
both Houses, id at 2330, 2383-84.
118. Act of May 11, 1866, ch. 80, 14 Stat. 46, 47.
119. See supra notes 64-118 and accompanying text.
120. Senator Davis noted that as of January 25, 1866, over 80 proposals to amend the Consti-
tution were pending. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 415 (1866). Four topics predominated:
protecting the rights of citizens; apportioning seats in Congress; disqualifying former Confederates
from holding federal office; and repudiating the rebel debt and validating the United States' debt.
C. FAIRMAN, supra note 34, at 1261; see also 2 J. BLAINE, supra note 23, at 188-92; B. KENDRICK,
supra note 51, at 266-67; J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note 23, at 580-84. The Joint Commit-
tee formed subcommittees to inquire into conditions in the southern states, B. KENDRICK, supra
note 51, at 47-48, and these subcommittees conducted hearings intermittently between January
and April, 1866, id at 264. Witnesses recounted continuing violence toward blacks and loyalists,
the enactment of the Black Codes, and the maladministration of justice. Id at 267-78.
121. Section 1 reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
122. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 34, at 1270-74, 1281-83; Dimond, supra note 20, at 486-91.
123. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Bingham)
(Section 1 would "protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the
Republic and the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be
abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State."); see also Id at 2766 (remarks of
Sen. Howard). Many legislators made only brief mention of section 1. See, e.g., id at 2465 (re-
marks of Rep. Thayer), 2510 (Rep. Miller), 2511 (Rep. Eliot). Sections 2, 3, and 4 apparently were
more controversial. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 34, at 1261.
124. See supra note 20; see also Bickel, supra note 12; Kaczorowski, Searchingfor the Intent of
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 CONN. L. REV. 368 (1972-73).
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without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."' 25 Deprivation of life or liberty
by a state typically occurs by police action or following a court pro-
ceeding. "'Due process of law,'" now, as then, "generally implies and
includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer,
and a trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings."'
126
Similarly, denial of equal protection of the laws occurs when state leg-
islators pass legislation that discriminates against a particular class, or
when executive and judicial officials apply facially neutral laws in a
discriminatory manner.
The legislators' comments on section 1 confirm this interpretation.
Section 1, in their view, would abolish the Black Codes 127 and enable
Congress to pass legislation requiring states to administer justice
fairly. 28 Many members supported section 1 because they believed it
would "incorporate the guaranties of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the
organic law of the land." 29 The frequent references to the Civil Rights
Act in the debates on the fourteenth amendment further strengthen the
125. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I.
126. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 280
(1855). Raoul Berger has argued that historically, due process "related tojudiialprocedures pre-
liminary" to the deprivation of life or property. R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 195 (emphasis in
original). He notes that
in virtually all of the State constitutions extant in 1866 the words "due process of law"
...were. . . almost always found "in a section of the Constitution dealing exclusively
with the conduct of criminal trials, with the privileges of the accused, with a process in
which the whole question is whether the person concerned shall be deprived of one or
another of certain rights; that is of life, orpersonal liberty, or property as a penalty for a
crime; and it is declared that he shall not, without due process."
Id at 199-200 (emphasis in original) (quoting Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term 'Ziberty"
in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect 'Lfe, Liberty and Property, "
4 HARV. L. REv. 365, 369 (1891)). It may reasonably be assumed, as Professor Berger asserts, that
the lawyers who framed the Fourteenth Amendment undoubtedly were familiar with this associa-
tion of due process and judicial procedures. Id at 200.
127. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (remarks of Rep. Bingham), 2459
(Rep. Stevens), 2766 (Sen. Howard), 2961 (Sen. Poland), 3034 (Sen. Henderson) (1866).
128. See, for example, the remarks of Rep. Bingham, id at 1064 (secures right for party ag-
grieved in his person to seek protection in the courts), 1090 (gives Congress power to punish state
officials for violation of their oaths to uphold the Constitution), 1094 (gives to everyone the right
to "impartial, equal, exact justice"). See also id at 2961 (remarks of Sen. Poland), 2082-83 (Rep.
Perham), 2510-11 (Rep. Miller). Opponents of section I also recognized the power it extended to
Congress to intrude into state affairs. See, e.g., id at 1063-64 (remarks of Rep. Hale), 2081 (Rep.
Nicholson), app. 134 (Rep. Rogers), 2500 (Rep. Shanklin), 2506 (Rep. Eldridge).
129. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32 (1948); see, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2465
(remarks of Rep. Thayer), 2498 (Rep. Broomall), 2283 (Rep. Latham) (1866). Senator Henderson
complained that some state courts were holding the Civil Rights Act unconstitutional, thus neces-
sitating its incorporation in the Constitution. Id at 3035. Opponents also recognized this purpose
of section 1. See, e.g., id at 2538 (remarks of Rep. Rogers) (Section 1 "is no more nor less than an
attempt to embody in the Constitution of the United States that outrageous and miserable civil
rights bill.").
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conclusion that a primary purpose of section 1 was to empower Con-
gress to reform state judicial-legal systems.130
The fourteenth amendment was not limited to discrimination
based on race. Echoing the Civil Rights Act debates, 31 Congress ex-
pressed concern about continuing violence, discriminatory legislation,
and harassment in southern courts directed at white loyalists and
Union soldiers. t32 Thus, denial of due process and equal protection,
even for non-racial reasons, would provide grounds for congressional
intervention. Moreover, Congress planned to designate the federal
courts the chief enforcer of section 1.133 The fourteenth amendment
passed the House on May 10, 1866,134 and with amendments, was ap-
proved by the Senate on June 8.135 On June 13, the House concurred
in the amendments and sent the measure to the states for ratification. 1
36
Some legislators thought passage of the fourteenth amendment would resolve lingering
doubts as to the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., id at 2498 (remarks of Rep.
Broomall), 2502, 2513 (Rep. Raymond), 2511 (Rep. Eliot), 3069 (Rep. Van Aernam). Others be-
lieved passage would prohibit a future Congress from repealing the measure should the Demo-
crats gain control. See, e.g., id at 2459 (remarks of Rep. Stevens), 2462 (Rep. Garfield), 2509
(Rep. Spalding), 2896 (Sen. Howard).
130. Thus the purpose was the same as that of the Civil Rights Act, namely to reform southern
justice. See supra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1065, 1091, 1093-94 (remarks of Rep. Bing-
ham), 1066 (Rep. Price), 2082 (Rep. Perham) (1866).
133. Id at 1089-90 (remarks of Rep. Bingham). The Supreme Court has repeatedly empha-
sized that the judiciary is to play a primary role in the protection of constitutional rights, including
those rights established by the fourteenth amendment. For example, in Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228, 241 (1979), the Court stated that in the "great outlines" of the Constitution itself, "the
judiciary is clearly discernible as the primary means through which [constitutional] rights may be
enforced." And in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946), the Court held that "it is established
practice for this Court to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect
rights safeguarded by the Constitution and to restrain individual state officers from doing what the
14th Amendment forbids the State to do." (footnotes omitted).
134. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2545 (1866).
135. Id at 3042. Section 1 was amended to add the first sentence: "All persons born or natu-
ralized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside." Id at 3040.
136. Id at 3149. Harold Hyman has asserted that Congress did not intend "a national moni-
toring system over state behavior" in 1866 because the fourteenth amendment and the related
legislation "relied on individuals to secure their rights through private case-by-case litigation" and
"provided. . . unabrasive enforcers for use in the national courts." H. HYMAN, SUpra note 104, at
468. This view fails to appreciate the broad sweep and potential impact of the language Congress
used in these various measures. The Freedmen's Bureau bill authorized Bureau officials to hear
"all cases affecting negroes. . . or other persons who are discriminated against," see supra text
accompanying note 66 (emphasis supplied), and the Civil Rights Act authorized removal of "all
causes, civil or criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce" in local tribunals
rights secured by the Act, see supra text accompanying note 82 (emphasis supplied).
Congress knew that the problems with the administration of justice were widespread and
systemic. Thus, while intervention was to be on a case-by-case basis, Congress contemplated that
the number of cases involved would be enormous. Indeed, the May 11, 1866 amendments to the
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The Freedmen's Bureau bill, the Civil Rights Act, the May 11
Amendments to the 1863 Habeas Corpus and Removal Act, and the
fourteenth amendment were the primary responses to the reconstruc-
tion problem in the first session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress. 137 Con-
gress adjourned without reaching agreement on what, if any, steps
beyond ratification of the fourteenth amendment would be required to
achieve readmission of southern representatives to Congress.1 38
During the summer and fall of 1866, it became increasingly appar-
ent that the South would defy Congress. The southern governmental
structure put in place by President Johnson 139 remained rebel-domi-
nated and exclusively white.140 Violence against blacks, loyalists, and
Union soldiers continued, 141 as did discriminatory treatment of these
1863 Habeas Corpus and Removal Act were intended to facilitate the removal of thousands of
cases from state to federal court. See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text. The federal
courts can hardly be described as "unabrasive enforcers" of federal rights, if, as Congress in-
tended, a substantial proportion of state litigation was to be unceremoniously wrenched from the
state courts.
During the ratification debate on the fourteenth amendment, opponents understood that
Congress intended "a national monitoring system over state behavior" in general and over the
behavior of state judges in particular. For example, Interior Secretary Browning wrote a letter
that appeared in The Cincinnati Commercial severely criticizing the amendment on those grounds:
"The object and purpose are manifest. It is to subordinate the State judiciaries in all
things to Federal supervision and control; to totally annihilate the independence and
sovereignty of State judiciaries in the administration of State laws. . . . [B]y virtue of
this new provision, if adopted, every matter of judicial investigation, civil or criminal,
however insignificant, may be drawn into the vortex of the Federal judiciary."
Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments
and the History ofthe Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1457 (1975)
(quoting Cincinnati Commercial, Oct. 26, 1866, at 2, col. 4).
137. Congress passed additional measures aimed at the maladministration of justice in the
South. The Separable Controversies Act, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306 (1866), was enacted to curb the
southern state court practice of allowing local plaintiffs to join local defendants in suits against
citizens of the North, thus destroying complete diversity and blocking removal to federal court.
H. HYMAN, supra note 104, at 472. The Act allowed a nonresident defendant to remove his por-
tion of the case to federal court, leaving the claims against the resident defendant for adjudication
in the state court. Separable Controversies Act, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306 (1866). Yet another statute
allowed federal revenue agents to remove state suits to federal court. Internal Revenue Act of July
13, 1866, ch. 182, 14 Stat. 98, 171. Harold Hyman sees in these enactments the "symbiotic relation-
ships growing between Congress and the national courts, in which the latter served the nation as
the primary executor of federal law." H. HYMAN, supra note 104, at 472.
138. See generally C. FAIRmAN, supra note 34, at 262-64; B. KENDRICK, supra note 51, at 327-
38.
139. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
140. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 34, at 258; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. app.
33 (1866) (report of Major General Jeff C. Davis citing rebel political control in Kentucky).
141. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. app. 33 (report of General Jeff C. Davis), app.
35 (report of General D.E. Sickles) (1866); 2 J. BLAINE, supra note 23, at 233-35; J. RANDALL & D.
DONALD, supra note 23, at 587.
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groups by southern justice systems. 142 Officers of the Freedmen's Bu-
reau and the army tried to cope with these problems, 143 but "the mass
of southern opinion was hardening against cooperation; indeed, it was
becoming overtly hostile toward the federal presence.'"144 The Civil
Rights Act proved ineffective in enforcing fair treatment in southern
courts.145 And, as the final straw, southern state legislatures refused to
ratify the fourteenth amendment. 46
3. Congressional Reconstruction from 1867-1870. Fresh from a
triumph in the 1866 elections, 147 Republicans were in an assertive and
angry mood when the second session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
convened. 48 The legislators complained about the continuing violence
142. Reports of Union military personnel presented a mixed picture of the administration of
justice. General Sheridan reported: "My own opinion is that the trial of a white man for the
murder of a freedman in Texas would be a farce, and in making this statement I make it because
truth compels me, and for no other reason." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. app. 30 (1866).
General Thomas J. Wood reported that "substantial justice is now administered throughout [Mis-
sissippi] by the local judicial tribunals," but he acknowledged that "many outrages and crimes"
have gone unpunished. Id at app. 32. General D.E. Sickles reported from South Carolina that
"[w]hen arrests are made by military authority and the parties turned over to civil tribunals, the
accused are generally admitted to easy bail." Id at app. 35.
143. The Freedmen's Bureau received more than 100,000 complaints in 1866. H. HYMAN &
W. WIECEK, supra note 25, at 420. The reports of the military personnel describe the army's
response. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. app. 30-37 (1866).
144. H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 25, at 420.
145. S.C. Gardner, an Alabama Freedmen's Bureau officer, explained why the Civil Rights
Act was not working in a letter to Senator Charles Sumner:
[R]ecourse to the federal district or circuit courts under the Civil Rights Law was ".
too cumbersome for the effect. It is like using the Great Eastern [the world's largest ship]
for a ferry-boat. It is remote and infrequent, and homeless complainants [who] are com-
pelled to get a livelihood where they can, often drift out of reach and knowledge. The
same is true of witnesses."
H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 25, at 424 (quoting letter of Nov. 19, 1866). Hyman and
Wiecek conclude: "The Civil Rights law was failing where it counted most, in local communities
and neighborhoods; failing less due to formal denials of civil rights by state officers of high visibil-
ity than by almost invisible, scattered, low-rank local officials who administered state laws and
community justice." Id at 425; see also Soifer, supra note 20, at 688-89.
146. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 34, at 254.
147. In the Fortieth Congress, which convened the following March, the Republicans had
majorities ofalmost three to one in the House and almost four to one in the Senate. C. FAIRMAN,
supra note 34, at 182. The Republican victory was seen as a repudiation of the President's policies
and a signal to Congress to continue to address the Reconstruction problem vigorously. 2 J.
BLAINE, supra note 23, at 246, 250.
148. See 2 J. BLAINE, supra note 23, at 246-50; C. FAIRMAN, supra note 34, at 253-57; B.
KENDRICK, supra note 51, at 354-57. Numerous bills and resolutions calling for the dismantling
of the Johnson governments in the South or for enfranchisement of blacks were introduced at the
outset of the session. B. KENDRICK, supra note 5 1, at 355-56; see, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
2d Sess. 11, 15, 211 (1866).
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directed against blacks and loyalists, 149 the general lack of security of
life and property, 50 and the widespread breakdown of southern jus-
tice.' 5' Ultimately, Congress decided that drastic measures were re-
quired to deal with these problems. The Military Reconstruction Act
of March 2, 1867, sent the Army "to guaranty present protection and
equal justice."' 52 To secure readmission of their representatives to
Congress, the rebel states were required to form new governments,
grant impartial suffrage, and ratify the fourteenth amendment. 53 In
149. Complaints of violence appear repeatedly throughout the first 1500 pages of the record of
the session. For examples, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 154, 251, 255, 349, 536, 560,
594, 628, 1104, 1178-79, 1186-87, 1375-77, 1462 (1866-67). Numerous speakers cited the race riots
in Memphis and New Orleans, see, e.g., id at 351 (Rep. Broomall), 28-29 (Rep. Eliot), 1175 (Rep.
Shellabarger), 1178 (Rep. Kelley), 1633 (Sen. Howe), and some noted the complicity of southern
officials in the slaughter of blacks, see, e.g., id at 351 (Rep. Broomall), 1175 (Rep. Shellabarger),
1633 (Sen. Howe).
150. See, e.g., id at 211 (Sen. Ross), 160 (Sen. Trumbull), 349 (Rep. Broomall), 1083 (Rep.
Lawrence), 1101 (Rep. Raymond), 1181 (Rep. Allison), 1210 (Rep. Boutwell).
151. Speakers noted that the Black Codes often continued in force, and that facially neutral
laws were administered in a discriminatory manner. See, e.g., id at 16 (remarks of Sen. Sumner),
153-54 (Reps. Stevens and Schenck), 1179 (Rep. Kelley), 1632 (Sen. Howe).
Virtually all southern justice officials were criticized for refusing to administer the law fairly,
including sheriffs and constables, jailors, grand jurors, petit jurors, and judges. See id at 160, 255,
560, 1101, 1179, 1187, 1370-71, 1567-69, 1631, app. 94-95, app. 99-100, app. 161. The Civil Rights
Act, some noted, had been ineffective in achieving the sort of systemic reform Congress sought.
See id at 1367 (Sen. Morrill), 1370-71 (Sen. Henderson), 1375-76 (Sen. Wilson).
The extent of Congressional frustration over the maladministration of justice in the South,
and particularly over the conduct of southern judges, is indicated by the proposal offered by Rep-
resentative Lawrence on February 7, 1867: "[T]he district courts of the United States [in the rebel
states] ... shall have power and jurisdiction ... to hear and determine all causes, proceedings,
and rights of action at law, in equity, and all matters of probate and testamentary jurisdiction as
fully" as the state courts could hear such matters before the war. Id at 1084. He also proposed
that the criminal laws of the District of Columbia "shall be in force" in the rebel states, and that
prosecutions for alleged violation of these laws would likewise be heard in the federal courts. Id
Lawrence's proposal extended the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts well beyond
Article III limits; indeed, he appeared to contemplate replacement of the state courts by the fed-
eral courts. His proposals were not adopted.
152. Id at 1098 (remarks of Rep. Thayer). The Military Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat.
428 (1867), passed over President Johnson's veto, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1976 (1867),
was modestly titled "An Act to provide for the more efficient Government of the Rebel States." It
declared that "[w]hereas no legal State governments or adequate protection for life or property
now exists in the rebel States," the states were to be divided into five military districts. Military
Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). The commanding officer of each district was
assigned the duty "to protect all persons in their rights of person and property" and to "suppress
...violence." Id In addition, he was authorized to try all offenders before military tribunals
when in his judgment the local courts were inadequate. Id
153. The readmission process had several steps. First, each rebel state was required to form a
new constitution. Delegates to the state constitutional convention were to be elected by all adult
males, black and white, except for those persons disqualified by section 3 of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The constitution had to provide for impartial suffrage and be approved by a majority of
persons voting on its ratification. The constitution also had to be examined and approved by
Congress. Finally, the state legislators elected under the new constitution were required to ratify
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addition, Congress passed legislation further increasing the role of the
federal courts in monitoring southern justice. 154
Despite attempts to circumvent the provisions of the congressional
enactments, 55 the South had little choice but to follow Congress's di-
rections.' 56 The fourteenth amendment was ratified by most southern
the fourteenth amendment. Military occupation would cease when these requirements were met
and the fourteenth amendment became effective. Military Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat.
428, 429 (1867). For detailed accounts of the Military Reconstruction Act's passage through Con-
gress, see C. FAIRMAN, supra note 34, at 285-309; B. KENDRICK, supra note 51, at 358-414.
154. On February 5, 1867, Congress enacted two amendments to the Judiciary Act of 1789.
One allowed federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus in "all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States." Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. The other amendment eliminated lan-
guage in section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 restricting the Supreme Court to consideration of
federal questions in reviewing state court decisions on writ of error. Id at 386-87.
The limited Congressional debate makes clear that Congress intended the habeas corpus
amendment to empower federal courts to reach persons held in state custody in violation of fed-
eral law, and that the measure should be broadly construed. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 4230 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull), 4151 (Rep. Lawrence) (1867). Some scholars have
questioned the intended scope of this provision. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 436 (1963). Com-
pare Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of l867 The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI.
L. REv. 31 (1965), with Amsterdam, supra note 48, at 819-23.
The second of these amendments on its face greatly expanded the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction by opening all issues in a case to that Court's review. As Charles Alan Wright has
argued, it "seems entirely plausible that Congress intended by eliminating the proviso to open the
whole case for review by the Supreme Court, if there is a federal question in the case sufficient to
take the case to the Supreme Court." C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL CouRTs 746 (1983). Profes-
sor Wright is plainly correct in noting that "[sluch a course seems wholly consistent with the
temper of the times." Id The amendment was consistent with the power extended to the lower
federal courts to hear state law issues in cases removed to federal court because the state courts
discriminated. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation and held that the
amendment worked no change in the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Murdock v. Memphis, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). Anthony Amsterdam has commented on the Murdock holding:
I have serious doubts (as did the Justices) whether the result in that case was purposed by
Congress; and this very doubt whether Congress might not have meant to turn Supreme
Court review into a sort of post hoc removal suggests the extreme disfavor in which the
Thirty-ninth Congress held the state courts.
Amsterdam, supra note 48, at 819 n. 11.
In addition, the 1863 Habeas Corpus and Removal Act was amended on February 5, 1867. If
a case was removable from state to federal court under the 1863 Act (or under the Act as amended
in 1866) and a state judge refused to release from state custody the party seeking removal, a
federal court could compel his release by habeas corpus. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
Congress also amended the Separable Controversies Act, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306 (1866), see
supra note 137. This amendment allowed nonresident plaintiffs, as well as defendants, to remove
the portion of a suit involving diversity of citizenship to federal court. Moreover, removal was
authorized upon an affidavit stating that the party "has reason to and does believe that, from
prejudice or local influence, he will not be able to obtain justice in such State court." Act of Mar.
2, 1867, ch. 196, § 1, 14 Stat. 558, 559.
155. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 34, at 404-29.
156. Registration of voters took place in late summer and early autumn of 1867, and constitu-
tional conventions were held in the late fall of that year and in the early spring of 1868. Id at 89,
433. Constitutions were formed and approved and legislatures elected. 2 J. BLAINE, supra note 23,
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states and became effective July 28, 1868.157 By that date, only Geor-
gia, Mississippi, Virginia, and Texas had not gained readmission of
their representatives to Congress. 58 By the spring of 1870, every state's
representatives had secured readmission to Congress.
159
4. Congressional Action in the Spring of 1871. As Reconstruction
of the southern states was completed, military control was with-
drawn.1 60 For most southern whites, however, "there was really no in-
tention to acquiesce in the legislation of Congress, no purpose to abide
by the Constitutional Amendments in good faith."' 6' The Ku Klux
Klan and similar groups spread terror in an organized and systematic
manner 162 while southern criminal justice officials turned a deaf ear to
the victims' complaints. 63 Congress responded by passing the Civil
Rights Act of April 20, 1871.164
at 300; Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1146-47
(1977). Blacks exercised their right to vote in these elections. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 34, at 405-
29.
157. 2 J. BLAINE, supra note 23, at 309.
158. J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note 23, at 619.
159. Id at 619-22; see also 2 J. BLAINE, supra note 23, at 463-64.
160. 2 J. BLAINE, supra note 23, at 466.
161. 2 id at 467.
162. See 2id at 469-70; J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note 23, at 682-84. See generally D.
CHAMBERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE HISTORY OF THE Ku KLUX KLAN (1965).
163. See infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
164. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). Congress also enacted a measure on February 28, 1871, aug-
menting an Act passed May 31, 1870, which protected the right of blacks to vote under the
fifteenth amendment. The 1870 Act required state election officials to apply voter registration
requirements impartially, and prohibited any person from using force or intimidation to obstruct
registration or voting. Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 1-6, 16 Stat. 140, 141. The federal
courts were given exclusive jurisdiction over all actions, civil and criminal, brought under the Act.
Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 8, 16 Stat. 140, 142. The 1870 Act also reenacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144, pursuant to the
fourteenth amendment, CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3701 (1870) (remarks of Sen. Stewart),
and broadened that legislation's coverage to include aliens. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 628 n.6 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 327 n.10 (1941).
The February 28, 1871 amendments to the 1870 Act gave the federal courts a central role in
enforcing the legislation. Congress empowered the federal courts to appoint election supervisors
who in turn received broad powers to regulate election procedures. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99,
§§ 1-6, 16 Stat. 433, 433-35. The amendments also imposed duties on federal marshals to assist in
preventing intimidation or violence at the polls. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, § 8, 16 Stat. 433, 436.
Criminal sanctions were provided for interference with the supervisors or marshals, id § 10, 16
Stat. 433, 436-37, and offenders were to be tried in federal court. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, § 9,
16 Stat. 433, 436. In addition, the amendments created a private right of action in federal court for
damages or injunctive relief against persons violating its provisions. Id § 15, 16 Stat. 433, 438.
Finally, if federal officials or private persons were subjected to civil or criminal actions in a state
court for enforcing the provisions of the Act or exercising their rights under it, the cases could be
removed to federal court. Id § 16, 16 Stat. 433, 438-39.
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Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act created a private right of action
for damages or equitable relief against persons acting under color of
state law who deprived someone of rights secured by federal law, and
gave the federal courts jurisdiction to entertain such actions.' 65 Other
provisions provided damage remedies and criminal sanctions against
persons conspiring to deprive another person of constitutional rights, 66
authorized the President to suspend habeas corpus 67 and to send the
army to establish order, 68 and disqualified former Confederates from
jury service. 169
The Civil Rights Act consumed nearly all of the attention of the
first session of the Forty-Second Congress. Numerous legislators called
165. Section 1 of the Act reads as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That any person who, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be sub-
jected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall,
any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary
notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or
circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review
upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provi-
sions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled "An act to
protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of
their vindication"; and the other remedial laws of the United States which are in their
nature applicable in such cases.
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
The provisions of section 1 as presently codified read in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, or of the District of Columbia subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981).
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to
be commenced by any person:...
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, reg-
ulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution
of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. ...
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (Supp. V 1981).
166. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 13-14 (section 2) (presently codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1985 (Supp. V 1981)). The federal courts were given jurisdiction of such cases. Civil
Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 14. Section 6 of the Act (presently codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1986 (1976)) created a cause of action for damages against persons who had the power to pre-
vent violations of section 2 but failed to do so, and gave the federal courts jurisdiction over such
actions. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 6, 17 Stat. 13, 15.
167. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 4, 17 Stat. 13, 15.
168. Id § 3, 17 Stat. 13,'14.
169. Id, § 5, 17 Stat. 13, 15.
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Congress's attention to the substantial evidence of Klan violence, 70
and repeated familiar complaints concerning the widespread, systemic
breakdown in the administration of southern justice.' 7 ' Southern laws,
although typically not discriminatory on their face, continued to be ap-
plied unequally. 172 Legislators registered specific complaints concern-
ing virtually all components of the justice system. They protested that
southern sheriffs refused to serve writs properly or to investigate allega-
tions of crime and arrest offenders.' 7 3 Grand jurors often refused to
indict, and when indictments did occur, petit jurors refused to con-
vict.' 74 Witnesses regularly committed perjury or refused to testify.
175
Judges abused their bail-setting powers, 176 and refused or failed to ad-
minister justice impartially. 1
77
The debates also reveal that most legislators believed that the Con-
stitution provided Congress with ample power to correct these
170. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 30-36 (remarks of Sen. Scott), 152-60
(Sen. Sherman), 236-40 (Sen. Morton), 442-48, 490 (Rep. Butler), app. 190-96 (Rep. Buckley), app.
196-203 (Rep. Snyder), app. 283-99 (Sen. Stevenson) (1871). Dozens of others registered the same
complaint. Congress had before it a report of almost 600 pages concerning Klan violence. S. REP.
No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871). Many legislators recited the testimony in the report during the
debates.
171. For examples of general complaints of official failure to administer justice fairly and to
convict or punish those who violated the constitutional rights of others, see CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 197, 201, 369-70, 374, 428, 444, 459, 483, 502, 505, 608, 653-54, 665, and at app. 72,
78, 108, 147, 185, 190, 198, 252, 281, 312. Many legislators accused southern officials of either
belonging to the Ku Klux Klan or being in complicity with it. See, e.g., id at app. 72 (remarks of
Sen. Blair) (asserting that some southern sheriffs belonged to the Klan), 445 (Rep. Butler) (assert-
ing that the Tennessee legislature was in collusion with the Klan); see also id at 476 (Rep. Dawes),
608, app. 172 (Sen. Pool), 506 (Sen. Pratt), app. 183 (Rep. Platt), app. 201 (Rep. Snyder).
172. See, e.g., id at app. 300 (remarks of Sen. Stevenson) ("Unexecuted laws are no 'protec-
tion.' And this brings us to the very case: the states have laws providing for equal protection, but
they do not, because either they will not or cannot, enforce them equally; and hence a class of
citizens have not 'the protection of the laws.' "), app. 153 (Rep. Garfield), 277 (Rep. Porter), 333
(Rep. Hoar), 505-06 (Sen. Pratt).
173. See, e.g., id at app. 78 (remarks of Rep. Perry) ("sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not"),
334 (Rep. Hoar), 459 (Rep. Coburn), app. 185 (Rep. Platt).
174. Specific complaints of misconduct of jurors also can be found. Id at 155, 157-58, 201,
334, 429, 458, 481, 487, 502, and at app. 108, 172, 182, 193, 197-98, 252, and 270.
175. See, e.g., id at 201, 437, 458, 481, 502, 571, 653, and at app. 182, 199, 252, 270, 310.
176. See, e.g., id at 155 (remarks of Sen. Sherman) (recounting testimony ofsouthern newspa-
per editor that any persons charged with the murder of blacks were released on "straw bail"), 571
(remarks of Sen. Ames) (asserting that persons charged with murdering blacks were released on
only one hundred to five hundred dollars bail).
177. See, e.g., id at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey) (The "courts are in many instances under
the control of those who are wholly inimical to the impartial administration of law and equity."),
app. 185 (remarks of Rep. Platt) ("[N]o Republican, white or black, especially if he is a citizen
who has come here from another State or is at all prominent, can secure as plaintiff or defendant
anything like equal justice before the courts of [Virginia]."), app. 78 (remarks of Rep. Perry)
('judges, having ears to hear, hear not"); see also id at 201 (Sen. Nye), 321 (Rep. Stoughton), 482
(Rep. Wilson), 487 (Rep. Lansing), 653 (Sen. Osborn), app. 251 (Sen. Morton), 429 (Rep. Beatty).
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problems. For some members of Congress, the equation was simple.
The highest duty of government, they asserted, was to protect the citi-
zenry from violence and injustice, 17 8 and the Constitution conferred a
general power upon Congress to act to protect life, liberty and prop-
erty.17 9 Most of the legislators, however, relied specifically upon the
first and fifth sections of the fourteenth amendment for the power to
enforce constitutional rights.180
178. See, e.g., id at 427 (remarks of Rep. McKee); see also Id at 201 (Sen. Nye), 208 (Sen.
Sawyer), 367 (Rep. Sheldon), 439 (Rep. Cobb), app. 141 (Rep. Shanks).
179. See, e.g., id at 370 (remarks of Rep. Monroe) ("In interpreting the constitution of any
great, free country there is a fair presumption that it contains sufficient grants of power to the
legislative body to secure the great primal objects for which constitutions and Governments ex-
ist. . . . We feel that we ought to find in such an instrument protection for the people."); see also
Id at 374-75 (Rep. Lowe), 475-76 (Rep. Dawes), 487 (Rep. Lansing), 511 (Rep. Perce), app. 228
(Sen. Boreman).
180. See, e.g., id at 322 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton), app. 83 (Rep. Bingham), 375 (Rep.
Lowe), 390 (Rep. Elliott), 428 (Rep. Beatty), 448 (Rep. Butler), 504-06 (Sen. Pratt), 608-09 (Sen.
Pool), app. 182 (Rep. Mercur), app. 229 (Sen. Boreman), app. 256 (Sen. Wilson), app. 262 (Rep.
Dunnell), app. 299-300 (Sen. Stevenson).
Representative Wilson traced this argument with particular care. He believed that the
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment reached broadly to all branches of state government.
"Obviously the word [State] is used in its largest and most comprehensive sense. It means the
government of the State. What is a State in its true sense?. . . [I]t is a trinity: the legislative, the
judicial, and the executive; these three are one, the State." Id at 482; see also id at 506 (remarks
of Sen. Pratt), app. 182 (Rep. Mercur), 607 (Sen. Pool), app. 315 (Rep. Burchard), 696 (Sen. Ed-
munds). Thus, Wilson argued, the words "No State shall deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws" did not apply solely to legislative enactments which
discriminated on their face. Instead, the fourteenth amendment also prohibited unequal enforce-
ment or execution of the laws by state judicial and executive officials:
But it is argued that this word "deny" only means that a State shall not affirmatively by
statutory enactment discriminate between persons subject to its jurisdiction. . . . But
• . . this language cannot fairly or reasonably be construed to refer exclusively to denial
by statutory enactment. If such had been the meaning the language would have been
"no law shall be enacted," or "no legislature shall enact," etc., indicating in explicit terms
that it was a statutory denial that was meant.
Id at 482; see also id at app. 153 (Rep. Garfield), app. 182 (Rep. Mercur), app. 300 (Sen. Steven-
son), 697 (Sen. Edmunds), 459 (Rep. Coburn).
Moreover, in Wilson's view, neglect or failure of state officials to perform their constitutional
duties constituted a denial of equal protection:
[W]hen it is provided that no State shall deny to any person the equal protection of the
laws it certainly is meant and it is equivalent to a provision that all citizens shall be
equally protected. The word "deny," therefore, as here used, must be construed with
reference to the spirit of the whole instrument. It is equivalent to the phrase "fail or
refuse to provide for".
Id at 482. Other legislators agreed with this interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. See,
e.g., id at 501 (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen) ("A State denies equal protection whenever it fails
to give it. Denying includes inaction as well as action. A State denies protection as effectively by
not executing as by not making laws."); see also id at 334 (Rep. Hoar), app. 80 (Rep. Perry), 251
(Sen. Morton), app. 300 (Sen. Stevenson), app. 315 (Rep. Burchard), 459 (Rep. Coburn), 697 (Sen.
Edmunds). Based on Wilson's reasoning, Representative Burchard concluded that Congress
could require state officials to perform their duties:
[Congress] may doubtless require State officers to discharge duties imposed upon them as
such officers by the Constitution of the United States .... [Tihe officer who violates his
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Congress's broad construction of its enforcement powers during
the debate on the Civil Rights Act suggests that Congress meant to cre-
ate a broad remedy in section 1 of the Act.181 The civil remedy in the
federal courts against any person who, under color of state law, de-
prived another of federal rights could extend to state officials in all
branches of state government. It could reach the neglect or failure of
criminal and civil justice officials to perform constitutional duties. 182
The federal courts could require those officials to discharge their duties.
This interpretation of the scope of the civil remedy is given explicit
support in congressional statements about "how the courts would and
should interpret § 1."183 Representative Shellabarger, who introduced
the legislation, stressed that it should be broadly construed:
This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty
and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions author-
izing such statutes are liberally and beneficially construed. It would
be most strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the
rule of interpretation. As has been again and again decided by your
own Supreme Court of the United States .... the largest latitude
consistent with the words employed is uniformly given in construing
such statutes and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect
and defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the people.'
84
Representative Dawes envisioned vigorous federal court enforcement
of section 1 remedies:
[Hie, sir, who invades, trenches upon, or impairs one iota or title of
the least of [constitutional guaranties] to that extent trenches upon
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and this Constitution
official constitutional duty can be punished under Federal law. What more appropriate
legislation for enforcing a constitutional prohibition upon a State than to compel State
officers to observe it?
Id at app. 314. Clearly, Congress construed its enforcement powers under the fourteenth amend-
ment very broadly.
181. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 545 (1972) ("The broad concept of
civil rights embodied in the 1866 [Civil Rights] Act and in the Fourteenth Amendment is unmis-
takably evident in the legislative history of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.").
182. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970); see also Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527, 534-35 (1981) (negligent deprivation of constitutional rights is actionable under
section 1983).
183. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 684-85 (1978).
184. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. app. 68 (1871). Representative Shellabarger contin-
ued: "Chief Justice Jay and also Story say: 'Where a power is remedial in its nature there is much
reason to contend that it ought to be construed liberally, and it is generally adopted in the inter-
pretation of laws.' I STORY ON CONSTITUOIN, sec. 429." Id Representative Perry suggested
that in passing the Civil Rights Act, Congress intended to use the full measure of its constitutional
enforcement powers: "Now, by our action on this bill we have asserted as fully as we can assert
the mischief intended to be remedied. We have asserted as clearly as we can assert our belief that
it is the duty of Congress to redress that mischief. We also have asserted as fully as we can assert
the constitutional right of Congress to legislate." Id at 800; see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-
5 (1980); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978).
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authorizes us to bring him before the courts to answer therefor. That
covers, sir, all there is in the first and second sections of this bill ...
I submit. . . that there is no tribunal so fitted, where equal and exact
justice would be meted out in temper, in moderation, in severity if
need be.1
8 5
Senator Frelinghuysen made clear that section 1 remedies should be
used to redress denials of federal rights by state courts:
As to civil remedies, for a violation of [constitutional guaranties], we
know that when the courts of a State violate the provisions of the
Constitution or law of the United States there is now relief afforded
by a review in the Federal courts. And since the fourteenth amend-
ment forbids any State from making or enforcing any law abridging
these privileges and immunities . . . the injured party should have
an original action in our federal courts, so that by injunction or by
the recovery of damages he could have relief against the party who
under color of law is guilty of infringing his rights. As to the civil
remedy no one, I think, can object.
1 86
Opponents of the Civil Rights Act understood that its proponents
intended the federal courts to utilize section 1 remedies to reform the
administration of justice in the South. Representative Holman com-
plained that "the jursidiction of the Federal courts, hitherto confined to
questions of national concern, is to invade the province of the State
courts with new laws and systems of administration."18 7 Senator Thur-
man, another opponent, expressed similar concerns:
185. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1871). Many other legislators explicitly intended
the federal courts to act aggressively to protect federal rights. See, e.g., id at 459 (Rep. Coburn)
(When there is a denial of equal protection by state officials, the "courts of justice of the nation
stand with open doors, ready to receive and hear with impartial attention the complaints of those
who are denied redress elsewhere."); see also id at app. 79 (Rep. Perry), 376 (Rep. Lowe), 389
(Rep. Elliott), 448-49 (Rep. Butler), 691 (Sen. Edmunds), 653 (Sen. Osborn). The Supreme Court
has recognized that "in passing § 1, Congress assigned to the federal courts a paramount role in
protecting constitutional rights." Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982).
186. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 501 (1871). Section 1 was modeled on section 2 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866,seesupra text accompanying note 80, and was intended to provide a civil
counterpart to the criminal sanctions in the earlier law. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
568-69 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds), app. 68 (Rep. Shellabarger), 461 (Rep. Coburn) (1871); see
also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 n.34 (1979). During the debates
on the 1866 Act, opponents of section 2 complained that state judges could be imprisoned for
violations of its provisions, and proponents explicitly acknowledged that this was their intent. See
supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. Providing milder civil remedies against state judicial
officers thus was relatively uncontroversial.
187. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. app. 258 (1871). Representative Eldridge, who also
opposed the bill, interrupted Representative Holman's speech to ask:
Has any gentleman in favor of this bill given to this House . . . any idea of a limit
beyond which the Federal Government may not go to the exclusion of the heretofore
conceded jurisdiction of the States in the redress of the violation of the rights of person
and property? I must confess I have not been able to understand them.
Id at app. 260. Representative Holman replied:
The question of my friend from Wisconsin is a very pertinent one. The record of the
debate will answer the question. . . . It is manifest the gentlemen recognize no such
limit. . . . If Congress possesses the power to legislate at all by virtue of the limitations
1016 [Vol. 1983:987
Vol. 1983:987] RES.4SESSING YOUNGER DOCTRINE
[The] whole effect [of section 1] is to give to the Federal Judiciary
that which does not now belong to it-a jurisdiction that may be
constitutionally conferred upon it, I grant, but that has never yet
been conferred upon it. It authorizes any person who is deprived of
any right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the Constitution
of the United States, to bring an action against the wrongdoer in the
Federal courts, and that without any limitation whatsoever as to the
amount in controversy. . . . In the next place, I object to it because
it is really, whatever else may be said about it, a disparagement of the
State courts. This bill embraces the whole United States; and to say
that every man who may be injured, however slightly, in his rights,
privileges, or immunities as a citizen of the United States can go to
the Federal courts for redress is to say, in effect, that the judiciary of
the States is not worthy of being trusted. . . . [T]here is no limita-
tion whatsoever upon the terms that are employed, and they are as
comprehensive as can be used.'88
Proponents of the Act also made clear that section 1 did not extend
only to racial discrimination. Whites had been subjected to Klan vio-
lence, 18 9 and southern state courts had routinely denied Union sympa-
thizers due process and equal protection. 90 As Representative
Shellabarger stated, section 1 "not only provides a civil remedy for per-
sons whose former condition may have been that of slaves, but also to
all people where, under color of State law, they or any of them may be
deprived of rights to which they are entitled under the Constitution."' 9 '
Finally, the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1871 reveal that
Congress did not intend the federal courts to withhold section 1 reme-
dies if complainants could seek relief in the state courts. The issue was
much discussed. Numerous opponents of the Act complained that sec-
tion 1 remedies would improperly interfere with state court proceed-
ings. 192 They repeatedly asserted that the state courts were in most
imposed on States by the first section of the fourteenth amendment, it seems impossible
to define any limit on the jurisdiction of... the Federal courts with respect to the meas-
ure of legislation affecting the great and varied subjects of domestic government.
Id
188. Id at app. 216-17; see also id at 352 (Rep. Beck), app. 88 (Rep. Storm), app. 50 (Rep.
Kerr), 365-66 (Rep. Arthur), 373 (Rep. Archer), 385 (Rep. Lewis), 396 (Sen. Rice), app. 91 (Rep.
Duke), app. 112 (Rep. Moore), app. 117-18 (Sen. Blair), app. 148 (Rep. Lamison), app. 179 (Rep.
Voorhees), app. 304 (Rep. Slater).
189. See, e.g., id at 156-57 (Sen. Sherman), 391 (Rep. Elliott), 412 (Rep. Roberts), 237 (Sen.
Morton), app. 270-71 (Rep. Havens), 456 (Rep. Coburn), 505-06 (Sen. Pool), 654 (Sen. Osborn).
190. See, e.g., id at app. 251 (remarks of Sen. Morton), app. 300 (Sen. Stevenson), 505 (Sen.
Pratt), app. 185 (Rep. Platt).
191. Id at app. 68;seeid at 696 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds);seealso Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 683 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 178 (1961).
192. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
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cases enforcing the laws fully and equally, 193 and urged that enforce-
ment of fourteenth amendment rights be left to these local tribunals.
94
In response, numerous supporters of the Civil Rights Act contended
that the federal courts must act because the state courts were either
unable or unwilling to vindicate federal constitutional rights. As Sena-
tor Morton stated:
But it is said. . . the matter should be left with the States. The an-
swer to that is, that ... the States do not protect the rights of the
people; the State courts are powerless to redress these wrongs. The
great fact remains that large classes of people . . are without legal
remedies in the courts of the States.
195
Representative Coburn explained why the federal courts provided a su-
perior forum:
The United States courts are further above mere local influence than
the county courts; their judges can act with more independence, can-
not be put under terror, as local judges can; their sympathies are not
so nearly identified with those of the vicinage; the jurors are taken
from the State, and not the neighborhood; they will be able to rise
above prejudices or bad passions or terror more easily . .. We be-
lieve that we can trust our United States courts, and we propose to do
SO.
1 9 6
Moreover, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act does not
indicate that the pendency of state proceedings should preclude a fed-
eral suit under section 1. Given Congress's persistent distrust of state
courts, this is hardly surprising. The record of the previous eight years
demonstrates that the Reconstruction Congresses repeatedly authorized
interference with pending state proceedings, and often on a massive
193. See, eg., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 346-47 (remarks of Sen. Davis), 378-79
(Rep. Shoker), app. 160 (Rep. Golladay), app. 179 (Rep. Voorhees), 574 (Sen. Stockton) (1871).
194. See, e.g., id at 361 (remarks of Rep. Swann), 429 (Rep. McHenry), app. 117 (Sen. Blair),
466 (Sen. Stockton), 480 (Rep. Lench), 604 (Sen. Saulsbury).
195. Id at app. 252; see also id at 201 (Sen. Nye) ("Sir, I would try the courts. Ah! what a
mockery they have become. . . and yet we are told. . . we should wait and let reason have time
to assume her throne. Sir, I have waited and waited until my ears have been pained with these
reports [of the maladministration of justice], and things grow worse. . . . I appeal to Senators
. . . to come up manfully to the duty, adopt the most stringent law that the Constitution will
permit."), 505 (Sen. Pratt) ("Plausibly and sophistically it is said that the laws of North Carolina
do not discriminate; that the provisions in favor of rights and liberties are general; that the courts
are open to all... [But the laws] fail in efficiency when a man of known Union sentiments, white
or black, invokes their aid."), app. 262 (Rep. Dunnell) ("Some here have contended that our
protection must come from the State in which we chance to reside. . . . [Wle are told the Federal
Government has nothing to do in behalf of the citizen unless, indeed, the state authorities call for
aid. These narrow views are repugnant to me."); see also id at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey), 346
(Sen. Sherman), app. 271 (Rep. Havens), app. 311 (Rep. Maynard), app. 183 (Rep. Platt).
196. Id at 460; see District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 428 (1973); Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 241 n.31 (1972).
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scale, when necessary to enforce federal constitutional lights. 197 There-
fore, as Representative Elliott explained, section 1 authorized "the as-
sertion of immediate jurisdiction through [the federal courts], without
the appeal or agency of the State in which the citizen is domiciled"' 98
to protect fundamental rights. 199
The Senate passed the Civil Rights Act by a vote of 36-13 on April
19, 1871.200 On April 20, the Senate received a report that the House
had approved the measure as well.20 1 President Grant signed it into
law the same day.
20 2
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 marked the culmina-
tion of Congress's intense concern with the ongoing problems of vio-
lence and maladministration of justice in the South. Between 1865 and
1871, Congress responded to these problems by passing the fourteenth
amendment and a succession of related statutes in order to achieve sys-
temic reform of the administration of both criminal and civil justice in
the South.
197. In a series of at least eight enactments in the eight years preceding passage of the Civil
Rights Act, and most recently in the Enforcement Act of February 28, 1871, see supra note 164,
Congress had authorized and broadened the rights of litigants to remove both criminal and civil
proceedings to federal court when fundamental rights were not effectively safeguarded in thepend-
ing state proceeding. See supra notes 137, 154; supra notes 82-83, 102-16 and accompanying text.
198. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 389 (1871); see also id at 692 (remarks of Sen. Ed-
munds). Representative Storm, an opponent of the Act, summed up the effect of section 1 as
follows:
[Section 1] does not even give the State courts a chance to try questions or to show
whether they will try the questions that might come before them under the first section of
the fourteenth amendment fairly or not. It takes the whole question away from them in
the beginning.
Now these questions could all be tried, I take it, in the State courts, and by a writ of
error, as provided by the 25th section of the [Judiciary] act of 1789, could be brought
before the Supreme Court for review. . . .But the first section of this bill does not allow
that right. It takes the whole question away at once and forever.
Id at app. 86. Representative Wilson, a proponent, strongly suggested that the courts should
honor Congress's wishes in interpreting section 1:
It is for Congress to look to the question whether or not the State affords that protection
the Constitution requires, and if it does not, then to provide the proper remedies.
And under [section 5 of the fourteenth amendment] Congress is not only the exclu-
sive judge of the necessity for application of remedies, but is also the exclusive judge of
what the remedies shall be.
Id at 482-83.
199. The Supreme Court succinctly summarized this aspect of the debates on section 1 in
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961):
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal
right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or
otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of
rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be
denied by the state agencies.
200. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 831 (1871).
201. Id at 832.
202. Id at 838;see Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. The Act also is reprinted
in CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 335-36 (1871).
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The legislators intended the federal courts to be the primary en-
forcers of the rights guaranteed by the constitutional amendment and
the newly-enacted laws.20 3 Congress authorized far-reaching federal
court intervention in the day-to-day workings of southern justice sys-
tems, making available virtually every possible remedy: removal,
habeas corpus, damages, injunctions, and criminal prosecutions.
20 4
The legislators firmly and repeatedly rejected suggestions that the fed-
eral courts should stay their hand in favor of theoretically available but
demonstrably ineffective state court remedies.20 5 Congress had con-
cluded that state courts neglected or refused to administer the laws in a
fair and impartial manner.20 6 To the Reconstruction Congresses, ab-
stention was anathema.20 7
III. EVALUATING THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE IN LIGHT OF THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION
The Civil War and Reconstruction wrought fundamental changes
in the structure of the federal system. 208 The federal government as-
203. See supra notes 137, 164; supra notes 99, 130, 153, 154 and accompanying text.
204. The conclusion that Congress intended the federal courts to act vigorously to enforce the
fourteenth amendment and the statutes of Reconstruction is strengthened by the prevailing as-
sumption of the era that courts had a duty to provide remedies for violation of constitutional and
statutory rights. In the nineteenth century, the maxim, "Where there is a right, there is a remedy,"
prevailed. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407-08 (1819); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). Thus, if a statute was enacted for a person's benefit
and the person was harmed by its violation, a court would provide a remedy even though the
statute did not provide one. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916); Hayes v.
Michigan Cent. R.R., IlI U.S. 228, 240 (1884); Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & Bl. 402, 118 Eng. Rep.
1193, 1196-97 (1854); 1 COMYNs' DIGEST 443-45 (A. Hammond, 5th ed. London 1822) (1st ed.
London 1776). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 190-204 (4th ed.
1971) (citing numerous state court cases of the late 1800's implying private rights of action from
statutes).
205. See supra note 137; supra notes 74, 87-90, 99, 154, 192 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 137;supra notes 72-3, 91-4, 151, 163, 171-77, 195 and accompanying text.
207. The Republican-controlled Forty-third Congress, which remained in office until March,
1875, passed the last two civil rights measures of this era. One sought to redress the states' failure
to protect blacks against discrimination in public accommodations, Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114,
18 Stat. 336, and the other extended the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts to all federal
question cases, Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. 470 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(Supp. V 1981)). These Acts marked the end of congressional Reconstruction. See generally C.
WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF RECON-
STRUCTION (1951).
208. These changes were not immediately apparent because the Supreme Court progressively
eviscerated the constitutional amendments and enforcement legislation of Reconstruction in the
last decades of the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 437-
39 (1904) (holding conduct by state officials in violation of their authority not to be state action
within section 1 of the fourteenth amendment); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-12 (1883)
(reiterating that Congress's enforcement powers under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment
were limited to state action); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 641-44 (1882) (holding uncon-
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sumed the role of guarantor of individuals' federal rights against state
power, 20 9 and the federal courts became the primary enforcers of fed-
eral rights.210 In recent decades the federal courts have made broad use
of their equitable powers under the fourteenth amendment and the Re-
construction statutes to effect systemic change in the administration of
state and local government by desegregating schools, 211 reapportioning
legislatures, 212 and improving conditions of confinement for institu-
tionalized persons. 213 Courts have generally refused, however, to use
those powers to reform state criminal and civil justice systems. 214 The
chief impediment has been the Younger v. Harris nonintervention doc-
trine. 215 As noted earlier, Supreme Court decisions applying and ex-
stitutional part of section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 because it reached private conduct);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 559 (1876) (reducing rights protected by section 6 of the
Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74-81 (1873)
(excluding most civil rights from scope of fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities
clause). See generally Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 156, at
1156-61.
During the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Reconstruction meas-
ures to broaden the interests the federal government is allowed to protect and to increase the range
of conduct proscribed by the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457
U.S. 496, 503 (1982) (rejecting requirement that plaintiffs in section 1983 actions exhaust state
administrative remedies); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 421-22 (1968) (extending 42
U.S.C. § 1982 to private racial discrimination in housing); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299,
325-29 (1941) (defining "under color of' law requirement of section 20 of the Criminal Code,
currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976), to include action by state officers in violation of state
law); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-85 (1961) (defining "under color of' law for section 1983
action in the same manner as for section 242); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 539-40 (1927)
(approving section 1983 damage action against election judges who complied with a state statute
prohibiting blacks from voting); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 283-
86 (1913) (rejecting argument that official action was not state action under fourteenth amendment
until state courts determined the action to be authorized by state law); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 157-60 (1908) (holding that suit against a state official alleging a fourteenth amendment viola-
tion is not barred by the eleventh amendment). See generally Developments in Law-Section 1983
and Federalism, supra note 156, at 1167-72.
209. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972); see also Patsy v. Board of Regents,
457 U.S. 496, 502 (1982).
210. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BusINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1927);
see also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 246-48 (1967); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-80
(1961); Amsterdam, supra note 48, at 828.
211. See, e.g., Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1971); Griffin
v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 230-34 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298-
301 (1955).
212. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583-87 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I,
7-18 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376-81 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37
(1962).
213. See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 625-27 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd and remanded, 507
F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
214. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376-80 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
677-79 (1974). But see, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 116-18 (1975).
215. 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
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tending that doctrine are largely devoid of discussion of the legislative
history of Reconstruction. 216 Examining Younger and its progeny in
view of that legislative history sheds new light on these cases and dem-
onstrates that the federal courts have been wrong in refusing to use
their equitable powers to reform state justice systems.
A. Younger v. Harris.
Younger is an appropriate place to begin examination of the doc-
trine of equitable restraint; in Younger the Court laid the foundation
for routine dismissal of most cases brought in federal court that impli-
cate ongoing state judicial proceedings. Plaintiff Harris was indicted
under California's Criminal Syndicalism Act for "distributing leaflets
advocating change in industrial ownership through political action.
'217
Although the California Act was vulnerable to serious constitutional
challenge, 218 District Attorney Younger pursued the case.219 Harris
moved unsuccessfully in the California trial court to have the case dis-
missed on constitutional grounds. When his petitions to the state ap-
pellate courts for writs of prohibition were also denied, Harris turned to
a federal court for an injunction against further prosecution. 220 A
three-judge federal district court held the statute unconstitutional and
granted the injunction.22' The Supreme Court reversed, citing "the na-
tional policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state
court proceedings except under special circumstances.
'222
Justice Black wrote the opinion of the Court223 in Younger. He
developed an elaborate rationale for why federal courts should decline
to hear certain cases that otherwise meet all the requisites of federal
jurisdiction. Justice Black cited the "ideals and dreams of 'Our Feder-
alism,' " which for him mandated "a proper respect for state functions"
and required that state institutions be allowed "to perform their sepa-
rate functions in their separate ways. '224 He found support for "Our
216. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
217. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 60 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
218. In 1969, one year after the lower court decision in Younger, the Supreme Court held a
similar Ohio statute unconstitutional. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
Brandenburg gave short shrift to Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), which had upheld
the California law, stating "Whitney has been thoroughly discredited by later decisions." 395 U.S.
at 447.
219. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 509-10 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
220. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 510 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
221. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
222. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41.
223. Only Justices Burger and Blackmun joined fully in Justice Black's opinion of the Court.
224. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
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Federalism" in the debates surrounding the drafting of the
Constitution.225
When Justice Black's opinion is juxtaposed with the legislative his-
tory of Reconstruction canvassed above, his vision of American feder-
alism appears fundamentally flawed, at least as to the allocation of
responsibility for vindication of federal constitutional rights. All of Jus-
tice Black's references to history concern the period when the Constitu-
tion was originally framed. He "disregard[ed] such intervening events
as the Civil War, the fourteenth amendment, the Civil Rights Act [and]
the federal jurisdictional grants of the Reconstruction era. '226 As the
Court held one year after Younger in Mitchum v. Foster,227 "[t]his legis-
lative history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was
altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect
to the protection of federally created rights," and was establishing "the
federal Government as a guarantor of [these] rights against state
power."
228
Justice Black exaggerated the deference owed by federal courts to
state courts when plaintiffs invoke section 1983. Congress clearly in-
tended section 1983 remedies to be used to redress denials of federal
rights by state courts,229 and did not intend a federal court to decline to
exercise jurisdiction just because a complainant could raise his claims
in state court.230 Instead, as Representative Elliott explained, section 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 authorized "the assertion of immediate
jurisdiction through [the federal courts] without the appeal or agency of
the state in which the citizen is domiciled."' 231
225. Id at 44-45.
226. Gibbons, Our Federalism, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1087, 1104 (1978); see also Fiss, Dom-
browski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1118 (1977); Soifer, supra note 20, at 651 n.5; Soifer & Macgill, The
Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEx. L. REy. 1141, 1170 (1977); cf. Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 116 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring) ("Vague ideas of dual federalism
.. . do not nullify what four years of civil strife secured and eighty years have verified. For it was
abuse of basic civil and political rights, by states and their officials, that the [fourteenth] Amend-
ment and the enforcing legislation were adopted to uproot.").
227. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
228. Id at 242, 239. In Younger, only Justice Douglas, who dissented, referred to the legisla-
tive history of Reconstruction. He observed that under the fourteenth amendment, section 1983,
and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, "the balance of the pressures of localism and nationalism. . . were funda-
mentally altered," 401 U.S. at 61, and that section 1983 was an expression of Congress's desire to
"'interpos[e] the federal government between the states and their inhabitants,' "id at 63 (quoting
opinion of Judge Will in the companion case of Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 200, 223 (N.D. Ill.
1968), rev'd sub nom. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971)).
229. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
231. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 389 (1871) (emphasis added). Moreover, Rep. Storm,
an opponent of the Act, explicitly recognized that section 1 did not require litigants to pursue the
state appellate route implicitly prescribed for Harris by the Younger Court: "Now these [four-
teenth amendment] questions could all be tried, I take it, in the State courts, and by a writ of error,
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The Younger Court could have argued that federal courts should
divest themselves of jurisdiction in these cases, in spite of the legislative
history of section 1983, because times have changed since 1871 and
dramatic intervention to prevent state court abuses is no longer war-
ranted. Yet the Younger Court eschewed such an explanation, perhaps
because the civil rights problems of the 1950's and 1960's demonstrated
that times had not changed. It is true that the Reconstruction Con-
gresses were not thinking about criminal syndicalism statutes or the
first amendment rights of California socialists when they passed the
fourteenth amendment and section 1983. Nevertheless, the actions of
the state officials in Younger are analogous to the abuses which
prompted the Reconstruction enactments.
Ultimately, the propriety of the Court's decision in Younger de-
pends on how one thinks constitutional provisions and remedial stat-
utes should be interpreted decades or centuries after their adoption and
enactment. Noninterpretivists presumably would have little trouble ap-
plying the fourteenth amendment and section 1983 to a case like
Younger, which fits squarely within the broad language of those meas-
ures.232 But interpretivists would insist that the work of state officials
should "be invalidated only in accord with an inference whose starting
point, whose underlying premise, is fairly discoverable in the Constitu-
tion." They would not insist, however, that "the complete inference be
found there-because the situation is not likely to have been fore-
seen. '233 The fourteenth amendment and the remedial statutes enacted
to enforce it were passed to overturn discriminatory state legislation
and to prevent state court harassment of persons holding unpopular
political views.234 The Reconstruction Congresses considered and re-
jected the possibility that federal courts should decline to exercise their
jurisdiction over cases challenging actions in ongoing state criminal
proceedings. 23 5 Therefore, the inference that the federal court should
have intervened to overturn California's law and enjoin prosecution of
Harris arguably has its "starting point," and its "underlying premise,"
as provided by the 25th section of the [Judiciary] [A]ct of 1789, could be brought before the
Supreme Court for review. . . . But the first section of this bill does not allow that right. It takes
the whole question away at once and forever." Id at app. 86.
232. See supra text accompanying note 13.
233. J. ELY, supra note 13, at 2. As Professor Joseph Grano states, "a narrow interpretivism
must be rejected unless we are prepared to take the radical step at this late date of reducing the
Constitution to nothing more than a code aimed at the framers' particularized grievances."
Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1,
63 (198 1); see also Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 961-
62 (1978).
234. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 70-76, 192-99 and accompanying text.
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in the Constitution and laws. Admittedly, however, the matter is not
wholly free of doubt.
B. O'Shea v. Littleton.
Whether legislative intent supported federal court intervention in
Younger is at least debatable. In O'Shea v. Littleton236 it is simply not
debatable. The fourteenth amendment and section 1983 were passed
specifically so that federal courts would act in cases like O'Shea. The
lawsuit grew out of the racial troubles in Cairo, Illinois. Long-smolder-
ing grievances of Cairo's black minority237 ignited in violence during
the summer of 1967 following the mysterious death of a black soldier in
a city jail.238 The National Guard was called in to restore order.239 In
the wake of the disturbances, some 500 to 600 whites formed a vigilante
group which became known as the "White Hats" because of the white
plastic civil defense helmets they wore.240 Led by Peyton Berbling,
state prosecuting attorney for Alexander County,241 the White Hats,
armed with rifles, patrolled Cairo streets in radio-equipped cars.
242
Nearly 450 of the vigilantes were deputized, 243 making "it legal for
them to carry a weapon." 244 During 1967 and 1968, blacks charged
that the White Hats "roamed freely, armed and agressive [sic], intimi-
dating the black community." 245
236. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
237. These grievances included racial discrimination in housing, employment, and education.
Fiss, supra note 226, at 1150. See generally P. GOOD, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CAIRO,
ILLINOIS: RACISM AT FLOODTIDE 37-48 (education), 56-64 (housing), 65-74 (employment) (1973);
Seng, The Cairo Experience.- Civil Rights Litigation in a Racial Powder Keg, 61 OR. L. REv. 285,
286-90 (1982).
238. See P. GooD, supra note 237, at 15-16; Janson, Guardsmen Patrol in Cairo, Ill. After Three
Nights of Violence, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1967, at 27, col. 1. Police claimed the soldier had hung
himself with his tee-shirt, but many residents were suspicious and charged police brutality. No
autopsy was performed, so the truth was never discovered. See id at 15.
239. See Janson, supra note 238, at 27, col. 1; Janson, Negroes DemandAction by Cairo, 11,
N.Y. Times, July 21, 1967, at 35, col. 6; see also P. GOOD, supra note 237, at 16.
240. See Lukas, BadDay at Cairo, Ill., N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1971, § 6 (Magazine) at 22, 83; see
also P. GooD, supra note 237, at 16-17; Janson, Cairo, Il., Divided by Racial Conflict; City Fears
Future, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1969, at 1, col. 1; King, Cairo, All., Is Quiet as Guard Patrols, N.Y.
Times, May 1, 1969, at 30, col. 4. Cairo's vigilante tradition is reviewed in Lukas, supra, at 64.
241. P. GooD, supra note 237, at 16; Lukas, supra note 240, at 83; Janson, supra note 240, at
29, col. 1.
242. Lukas, supra note 240, at 83; Janson, supra note 240, at 29, col. 1.
243. P. GOOD, supra note 237, at 18; Lukas, supra note 240, at 83.
244. Janson, supra note 240, at 29, col. 1 (quoting Harry L. Bolen, president of the Cairo
Chamber of Commerce).
245. P. GOOD, supra note 237, at 18. Cairo's criminal justice system generally failed to protect
blacks from the White Hats during this period. Given the official complicity in the group's forma-
tion and in the naming of deputies, this is hardly surprising. One incident is particularly reminis-
cent of the sorts of incidents that inflamed Congress in 1867. On July 30, 1968, Reverend Larry
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Blacks responded in the spring of 1969 by beginning an economic
boycott of Cairo's white-owned businesses.2 46 Picketing led to renewed
violence and arrests during the summer.247 Charges were made that
criminal justice officials applied the laws unequally.24 8 The boycott
and the violence continued for the next three years. Journalist Paul
Good summed up the events of this period as follows:
Intermittently over the next three years, Cairo would hear gunfire,
live with fear. Two of its mayors would resign, four police chiefs
would either resign or be fired. . . , and hundreds of citizens-the
vast majority black-would be jailed as an outgrowth of demonstra-
tions. During the next 11 months alone there would be at least 80
separate shooting incidents, most centered around the all-black Pyra-
mid Courts where some residents took to sleeping in bathtubs at
night to escape fusillades that pierced walls and windows. There was
not a single arrest made by the Police Department in these
shootings.
249
The plaintiffs in O'Shea250 sought federal court assistance in reme-
dying the problems with the administration of justice in Cairo. They
commenced a class action seeking damages and injunctive relief
against the state's attorney for Alexander County (Berbling), his inves-
tigator, the Cairo police commissioner, and two judges of the Alexan-
der County Circuit Court.25' The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
were intentionally engaged in a systematic and continuing program of
racial discrimination in the administration of criminal justice, and that
Potts, a White Hat member, "used a baseball bat to beat to death a 73-year-old black man he said
was attempting to rape his wife. A coroner's jury absolved him of any guilt." P. GOOD, supra
note 237, at 17.
Vigilante violence in Cairo was not aimed solely at blacks. White sympathizers were also
victimized. Id at 21; King, supra note 240, at 30, col. 3; King, In Cairo, Ill., Racial Tensions
Remain High After Week of Shooting andArson, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1970, at 27, col. 1.
246. Lukas, supra note 240, at 83.
247. See N.Y. Times, April 1, 1969, at 29, col. 8; id, April 28, 1969, at 7, col. 1; id, April 30,
1969, at 23, col. 1; King, supra note 240, at 30, col. 3. In June, 1969, the White Hats disbanded
under pressure from state officials. Shortly thereafter, however, the organization was replaced by
the United Citizens for Community Action, a group with "largely the same membership and ap-
parently much the same purposes." Lukas, supra note 240, at 83; see also P. GOOD, supra note
237, at 18.
248. Reverend Jesse Jackson of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference charged:
"There is not only a breakdown of justice in Cairo, there is a breakdown of law and order."
Janson, New Chief in Cairo, Il., N.Y. Times, June 17, 1969, at 28, col. 1.
249. P. GOOD, supra note 237, at 18. The United States Commission on Civil Rights held
hearings in Cairo in March, 1972. Witnesses testified that Cairo law enforcement officials were
untrained amateurs who failed to protect black citizens and enforced the laws unequally. The
police also were charged with brutality and with acting in complicity with white vigilantes. Id at
26-32.
250. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). The plaintiffs were nineteen citizens of Cairo; all but two were
black. Id at 491.
251. Id at 490.
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this program violated their first, sixth, eighth, thirteenth, and four-
teenth amendment rights as well as their rights under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1985.252 Berbling was charged with prosecut-
ing blacks more harshly than whites, 253 and the judges were charged
with similar abuses in setting bail and in sentencing.
254
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
and on the grounds that the judges were immune from suit for acts
done in their judicial capacity. The court of appeals reversed, re-
manded, and ordered the district judge to grant appropriate injunctive
relief if the plaintiffs proved their case.255 The Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals, invoking the doctrine of Younger v. Harris.2 56 The
O'Shea Court wanted to avoid "abrasive and unmanageable interces-
sion"257 into the day-to-day conduct of local criminal proceedings. By
seeking "an injunction aimed at controlling or preventing the occur-
rence of specific events that might take place in the course of future
252. Id at 490-9 1. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (Supp. V 1981).
253. Specifically, Berbling was charged with refusing to initiate criminal proceedings against
whites on the complaints of blacks. In those few cases where he did permit complaints, he submit-
ted the cases to a grand jury rather than proceeding by prosecutor's information. Before the grand
jury, he presented evidence in a manner designed to secure dismissal of the charges. Berbling also
was charged with lax prosecution of cases against whites, and with purposely losing such cases.
He also allegedly recommended relatively higher bonds for blacks than for whites, and filed
higher charges against blacks than whites for similar misconduct. Berbling's investigator was
charged with refusing to receive evidence from blacks against whites, and with conspiring with
Berbling to this end. See Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 392-93 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'dsub nom.
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); see also Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514, 516-18 (1974)
(the companion case to O'Shea).
254. The defendant judges were alleged to have set bonds according to an unofficial schedule
rather than tailoring bail to the facts of each case. They were also charged with imposing longer
sentences on blacks than on whites for the same offenses, and with requiring blacks to pay for jur
trials. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 393-94 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom O'Shea v. Lit-
tleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
255. Berbling, 468 F.2d at 414-15. The court of appeals also held that the judges and prosecu-
tor Berbling were immune from damage claims for acts done in their judicial or prosecutorial
capacity. Id at 395-410. The court refused to extend immunity, however, to acts by Berbling or
his investigator that resembled police rather than prosecutorial functions. Id at 410.
256. O'Shea, 414 U.S. 488, 499-504 (1974). The Court also held that the complaint failed to
present a case or controversy. The majority believed it unlikely that the named plaintiffs would in
the future be subjected to the kinds of injury described in the complaint. See id at 495-99. This
holding evoked a vigorous dissent from Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall. The dissent
pointed out that the named plaintiffs claimed that they had personally suffered from the defend-
ants' misconduct and that the defendants continued to engage in discriminatory practices. 414
U.S. at 507-08 (Douglas, J., dissenting). These allegations convinced the dissenters that it was
likely that the named plaintiffs as well as members of the class would be arrested in the future and
subjected to discrimination. Id at 509. Justice Douglas concluded: "This is a more pervasive
scheme for suppression of blacks and their civil rights than I have ever seen. It may not survive a
trial. But if this case does not present a 'case or controversy' involving the named plaintiffs, then
that concept has been so watered down as to be no longer recognizable." Id
257. 414 U.S. at 504.
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state criminal trials," the plaintiffs seemed to "contemplate interruption
of state proceedings to adjudicate assertions of noncompliance" in an
"ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings. 25 8 Thus, grant-
ing the relief requested "would indirectly accomplish the kind of inter-
ference that Younger v. Harris . . . and related cases sought to
prevent. 25 9 The Court suggested that the plaintiffs instead should pur-
sue such state remedies as a motion for a change of venue or for substi-
tution of a judge, review by direct appeal or by postconviction
collateral remedies, or institution of disciplinary proceedings.
2 60
The majority in O'Shea never mentioned the legislative history of
Reconstruction,2 61 despite the plaintiffs' reliance on the constitutional
amendments and legislation of that period. The legislative history
demonstrates that a dismissal pursuant to Younger was wholly inappro-
priate in O'Shea.262 The criminal justice abuses in Cairo bear an un-
canny resemblance to the abuses in the post-Civil War South.
263
Exactly the same kinds of complaints against exactly the same criminal
justice officials are involved in each instance. During Reconstruction,
southern police and prosecutors were charged with failing to protect
blacks against white violence, failing to investigate crimes by whites
against blacks, and failing to arrest whites on the complaint of
blacks.264 Nearly identical allegations were made in O'Shea.265 Re-
construction legislators, like the plaintiffs in O'Shea, complained of
grand jurors' failure to indict whites for crimes against blacks.266 From
258. Id at 500.
259. Id The Supreme Court considered the claims against Berbling in a related action,
Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 (1974). Because Berbling had been replaced as State's Attorney
by the time the Supreme Court heard the case, the Court remanded the claims against Berbling
with directions to the Court of Appeals to investigate whether they were moot. Id. at 522. Owen
Fiss has strongly criticized this result. See Fiss, supra note 226, at 1150-51.
260. O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 502. The Court also suggested federal habeas corpus or federal crim-
inal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976). Id at 502-03.
261. Neither, for that matter, did the concurring or dissenting justices.
262. Candor compels the author to admit that his views on O'Shea have been substantially
altered by viewing it in light of the legislative history. Cf Ziegler, supra note 2, at 288-89 (arguing
that the Younger doctrine was applied correctly in O'Shea v. Littleton).
263. The resemblance between Cairo and the South of 100 years before was explicitly recog-
nized by Cairo officials and residents. When Sheriff Roy Burke resigned his post, he complained:
"This community has a post-Civil War attitude with its fear, repression and economic problems,"
N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1970, at 18, col. 5. Another resident thought the white leadership was "still
in the 19th Century." N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1970, at 27, col. 3. Reporter Anthony Lukas noted that
Cairo is farther South than Richmond, Virginia, and "its racial attitudes are not very different
from those of Selma, Ala. or Jackson, Miss." Lukas, supra note 240, at 82-83.
264. See supra note 145; supra note 173 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 248-49 and accompa-
nying text.
266. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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1865 to 1871, state judges were repeatedly accused of failing or refusing
to execute the laws impartially,267 of discriminating in favor of south-
ern whites against loyalists and blacks,268 and of abusing their bail-
setting powers.269 Similar discriminatory activities were charged
against the defendant judges in O'Shea.
270
Finally, during Reconstruction criminal justice officials were
charged with failing to protect blacks and loyalists from vigilante orga-
nizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, with being Klan members them-
selves, and with acting in complicity with Klan members.271 The
parallels between the Klan and Cairo's White Hats are remarkable.
Not only did Cairo officials fail to protect blacks and white sympathiz-
ers against the White Hats, the officials deputized the vigilantes so that
they could act in the name of the law. Indeed, the prosecuting attorney
was the chief organizer of the group.
Congress enacted the fourteenth amendment and the numerous
pieces of enforcement legislation examined in Section II so that the
federal government could correct the sort of systemic maladministra-
tion of justice evident in Cairo. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment
was passed primarily to enable Congress to enact legislation requiring
states to administer justice fairly.272 Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, which created a private right of action against state officials for
violation of federal law and gave the federal courts jurisdiction over
such claims, was enacted specifically to address the twin problems of
Klan violence and maladministration of justice in the South.273 In
short, these measures were specifically aimed at abuses like those that
occurred in Cairo, Illinois.
The legislative history demonstrates that the Court erred in rele-
gating the O'Shea plaintiffs to state remedies. Throughout the Recon-
struction era, and particularly during the debates on the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, Congress rejected the suggestion that those aggrieved by a
state official's misconduct must pursue local remedies.274 Congress did
not suggest that the federal courts should stay their hand if the state
courts arguably became more reliable at some future time. Instead, the
267. See supra note 145; supra notes 91, 132, 176-77 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 145; supra note 176 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 145; supra note 171 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 165, 170-80 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 137; supra notes 71-74, 87-91, 99, 154, 192-99 and accompanying text.
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legislators created a federal remedy supplementary to the state
remedy.275
There are good reasons for making federal relief supplementary to
potential state remedies. It is virtually impossible for a federal judge to
know whether theoretically available state remedies will in fact be ade-
quate to vindicate federal rights. The federal judge must guess whether
the state process is so influenced by local politics and prejudices or so
hindered by practical deficiencies that protection of federal rights is un-
certain. Judges faced with this dilemma will be tempted to do what the
Court did in O'Shea-presume the adequacy of all alternative reme-
dies without evaluating their true effectiveness. As Owen Fiss has
noted, the "adequacy of [the] alternative remedies [in O'Shea] was evi-
dently to be presumed from the very fact that Justice White was able to
think of them. '2 76 Once a federal court dismisses a case because of the
Younger doctrine, litigants do not have the opportunity to return to
federal court to demonstrate that the judge guessed wrong and that
state remedies were unavailing. The presumption of the adequacy of
state remedies is irrebuttable.2 77
275. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961); see also Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S.
496, 506-07 (1982).
276. Fiss, supra note 226, at 1154. State remedies are rarely adequate for achieving systemic
relief. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. Rav. 1105, 1115-28 (1977); Zeigler, supra
note 2, at 305-06.
277. In O'Shea, the Court exaggerated the difficulties that the federal district court faced in
fashioning equitable relief. First, prior to trial the Court should not have assumed that broad-
based relief was necessary. Assuming that the plaintiffs showed the appropriateness of some re-
lief, there were many steps that could have been taken short of placing the Cairo criminal justice
system in receivership. As the court of appeals suggested, an "initial decree might set out the
general tone of rights to be protected and require only periodic reports of various types of aggre-
gate data on actions on bail and sentencing and dispositions of complaints." Littleton v. Berbling,
468 F.2d 389, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'dsub nom. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
Even assuming that the intransigence and bigotry of the defendants ultimately necessitated
"continuous or piecemeal interruptions of state proceedings . . . in an ongoing federal audit,"
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974), the court would still be acting within its authority.
Cairo only has 6000 residents, Lukas, supra note 240, at 82, and the plaintiffs named only five
officials as defendants. Monitoring their practices closely would not have been unworkable.
Moreover, the Reconstruction Congresses clearly intended that the federal courts should do all
that was necessary to remedy serious violations of federal rights in state criminal and civil justice
systems. See supra notes 70-73, 84-93, 181-88 and accompanying text. Legislators who authorized
the removal of thousands of cases from state to federal court lock, stock, and barrel, see supra
notes 136-37 and notes 83-86, 101-18 and accompanying text, and who sought systemic reform of
the justice systems of eleven states would hardly have balked at a federal judge looking over the
shoulders of five officials in Cairo, Illinois. At the very least, it is plain that the Reconstruction
legislators would have disapproved dismissal of the case at the outset. Indeed, in light of the
legislative history of Reconstruction, it is difficult to imagine a less appropriate case for abstention
than O'Shea v. Littleton.
Happily, persistent efforts by the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and its
successor organization, The Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation, have led to some gains
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C. Rizzo v. Goode.
O'Shea was the first Supreme Court decision extending Younger to
bar the use of federal injunctions for systemic reform of state criminal
justice practices. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this prohibition two
years later in Rizzo v. Goode.278 In light of the legislative history dis-
cussed in Section II, Rizzo seems almost as inappropriate a case for
abstention as O'Shea.
The Rizzo litigation grew out of allegations of pervasive, racially-
motivated police brutality in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 279 A number
of individuals and organizations filed two section 1983 class actions in
federal district court in 1970 against the Mayor, the City Managing
Director, the Police Commissioner, a Deputy Police Commissioner,
and a Police Captain,280 alleging a widespread pattern of police brutal-
ity toward blacks. The plaintiffs claimed that these officials knew of the
police misconduct and had tacitly condoned it by failing to take effec-
tive steps to reduce the incidence of brutality. Plaintiffs in one action
called for "removal or other appropriate disciplinary action in the cases
of certain named policemen; and establishment of appropriate machin-
ery to deal with civilian complaints against police." 281 Plaintiffs in the
other action asked the court to appoint a receiver to supervise the po-
lice department and prevent further violations.
2 82
The district court heard approximately 250 witnesses in hearings
for Cairo's black citizens in recent years in the areas of employment, housing, and political repre-
sentation. See Seng, supra note 237, at 300-12.
278. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). For a perceptive commentary on Rizzo, see Weinberg, The New
Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1191, 1215-27 (1977).
279. Although police brutality has been a concern in many large American cities, see generally
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report:
The Police 178-207 (1967), in the late 1960's and early 1970's Philadelphia had special problems.
These were attributable, in part, to the attitudes and actions of Police Commissioner (and later
Mayor) Frank L. Rizzo, a flamboyant figure who "liked to call himself the toughest cop in
America." Berson, "The Toughest Cop in America" Campaigns for Mayor of Philadelphia, N.Y.
Times, May 16, 1971, § 6 (Magazine), at 30 (hereinafter cited as The Toughest Cop). Rizzo was
repeatedly charged with brutality during his rise through the ranks of the police department, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 7, 1982, at 30, col. I, and even during his tenure as Commissioner. The Toughest
Cop, supra, at 56-57.
280. The first action, Goode v. Tate, was brought by Goode and two other individuals; the
second, Council of Orgs. on Philadelphia Police Accountabiliy & Responsibility (COPPAR) v. Rizzo,
was brought by 21 persons and four organizations. 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973), a§'d sub
nom. Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). COPPAR was an
unincorporated association of 32 community groups. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. at 364 n.l.
281. COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1291 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aj'd sub nom. Goode v.
Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
282. COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1291 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aj'd sub nom. Goode v.
Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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held over twenty-one days,2 83 and made detailed findings of fact.28 4
The court found that there was no "overall Police Department policy to
violate the legal and constitutional rights of citizens, nor to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race. ' 285 The record did show, however, "that such
violations do occur, with such frequency that they cannot be dismissed
as rare, isolated instances; and that little or nothing is done by city
authorities to punish such infractions, or to prevent their recur-
rence.' 28 6 The court declined to order appointment of a receiver or
even civilian review of police activities. Instead, the judge ordered the
defendants to submit a plan to establish new police department proce-
dures for receiving, investigating, and adjudicating civilian complaints
against the police.287 The court of appeals affirmed, finding the relief
ordered "limited and moderate in tone.
'2 88
The Supreme Court reversed.2 89 First, the Court questioned
whether the named plaintiffs presented an actual case or controversy.
Plaintiffs' "claim to 'real and immediate' injury," said the Court, "rests
not upon what the named [defendants] might do to them in the future
...but upon what one of a small, unnamed minority of policemenmight do to them in the future. ' 290 Thus, the Court concluded that the
named plaintiffs lacked a concrete personal stake in the reform of po-
lice disciplinary procedures.29'
Second, the Rizzo Court accused the district court of adopting "an
unprecedented theory of § 1983 liability"2 92 by holding defendants ac-
countable for failing to supervise adequately their subordinates. The
283. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 367 (1976).
284. See COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1294-1316 (E.D. Pa. 1973), a'd sub nor.
Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The district court consoli-
dated the cases for final judgment. COPPAR, 357 F. Supp. at 1290.
285. COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aft'd sub nom. Goode v.
Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
286. COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1973), ad sub nom. Goode v.
Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rey'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
287. COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1320-21 (E.D. Pa. 1973), a 'd sub nom. Goode v.
Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Supreme Court described the
relief that the district court ordered. The Police Commissioner promulgated a 14-page set of
guidelines and posted it in various public areas. The police department prepared a court-ap-
proved citizens complaint form and made it available to the public. The police department was
ordered to amend the police training manual to reflect the guidelines, and the department was
ordered to maintain adequate statistical records to allow court evaluations of the new procedures.
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 365 n.2 (1976).
288. Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
289. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
290. Id at 372.
291. Id at 372-73. For a penetrating analysis of this portion of the Court's opinion, see Fiss,
supra note 226, at 1156-58.
292. 423 U.S. at 373.
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Supreme Court appeared to disagree with the district court's conclusion
that the proof showed a pattern of misconduct.293 The Court also as-
serted that there was "no affirmative link between the occurrence of the
various incidents" of misconduct by "individual police officers not
named as parties" and the "adoption of any plan or policy by petition-
ers--express or otherwise-showing their authorization or approval of
such misconduct. ' 294 The Court brushed aside the contentions that the
plaintiffs had a "'right' to be protected from unconstitutional exercises
of police power, ' 295 and that in light of demonstrated patterns of police
misconduct, the defendants had a corresponding constitutional duty to
take steps to control their charges. "Such reasoning," the Court indi-
cated, "blurs accepted usages and meanings in the English language in
a way which would be quite inconsistent with the words Congress
chose in § 1983. We have never subscribed to these amorphous pro-
positions, and we decline to do so now. ' 296 The Court concluded that
the considerations of federalism developed in Younger and O'Shea
militated against intervention:
Thus the principles of federalism which play such an important part
in governing the relationship between federal courts and state gov-
ernments ... likewise have applicability where injunctive relief is
sought, not against the judicial branch of the state government, but
against those in charge of an executive branch of an agency of state
or local government. 2
97
The Rizzo majority opinion did not mention the legislative history
of Reconstruction, perhaps because the Court's conclusions find virtu-
ally no support in the legislative debates. The abuses by law enforce-
ment officials in Philadelphia were quite similar to, although less
extreme than, the abuses of their counterparts in the post-Civil War
South. Racially-motivated brutality directed at blacks by law enforce-
ment officials 298 and private individuals,299 and state and local officials'
failure to provide protection were predominant congressional concerns
during the debates on the fourteenth amendment and its enforcement
legislation.3°° These measures were enacted to enable the federal
293. Id at 367-68, 373.
294. Id at 371 (emphasis in original).
295. Id at 377.
296. Id at 376.
297. Id at 380.
298. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 141-42, 161-62 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 170 for expressions of concern over violence. See supra notes 62, 68, 91,
151, 163, 171-72 and accompanying text for complaints that local criminal justice officials were
failing to protect the freedmen.
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courts to remedy officials' failure to provide for basic physical
security.30
1
Congress's purposes emerged with particular clarity during the de-
bates on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which contained the provision
now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The debates reveal that the district
judge in Rizzo correctly construed the reach of that statute and of the
fourteenth amendment when he held Philadelphia's police leadership
accountable for individual officers' violations. It was the Supreme
Court that offered a novel and unsupportably narrow theory of section
1983 liability. In the spring of 1871, many legislators argued that the
highest duty of government was the protection of the citizenry from
violence and injustice.30 2 These legislators believed that state officials
violated the fourteenth amendment when they failed or refused to pro-
vide equal protection,30 3 and that the federal courts could require state
officials to discharge their duties in an even-handed manner.30 4 Con-
gress passed section 1983 specifically to create a private right of action
in federal court for injunctive and other relief against state officials who
failed in their duty to protect persons against racially-motivated vio-
lence and discrimination.30 5 Congress wanted section 1983 to be "lib-
erally and beneficially construed. ' 30 6 Thus, the Supreme Court in
301. The Freedmen's Bureau bill would have allowed the President to send in military forces
when by reason of "any State or local law, ordinance, police or other regulation, custom, or
prejudice" blacks did not "have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of person." (emphasis added). See E. MCPHERSON, supra note 27, at 73-74; supra note 64 and
accompanying text. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted to secure to freedmen the rights of
life, liberty, and property in face of the failure or refusal of state officials to enforce these rights.
See supra notes 85-86, 88-89, 91 and accompanying text. The debates on section 1 of the four-
teenth amendment make clear that its primary purpose was to enable Congress to pass legislation
requiring states to administer justice fairly and to "constitutionalize" the basic guaranties of the
1866 Civil Rights Act. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
303. See CONo. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 482 (1871). Other legislators agreed with this
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., id at 501 (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen)
("A State denies equal protection whenever it fails to give it."); see also id at 334 (Rep. Hoar),
app. 80 (Rep. Perry), 251 (Sen. Morton), app. 300 (Sen. Stevenson), app. 35 (Rep. Burchard), 459
(Rep. Coburn), 697 (Sen. Edmunds).
304. See supra note 303 and accompanying text; see also Monell v. New York City Dep't of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 670-72 (1978).
305. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text. The dissenting judges vigorously at-
tacked the majority's restriction of the scope of section 1983 on the ground that it was inconsistent
with the language of section 1983 and with prior Supreme Court and court of appeals cases.
Because section 1983 makes a state official responsible if he "subjects, or causes to be subjected"
any other person to deprivation of federally secured rights, the dissenters argued that "an official
may be enjoined from consciously permitting his subordinates, in the course of their duties, to
violate the constitutional rights of persons with whom they deal." 423 U.S. 362, 385 (Blackmun,
Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). The dissent also asserted that the majority's narrow inter-
pretation of section 1983 "casts aside reasoned conclusions to the contrary reached by the Courts
of Appeals of 10 Circuits." 423 U.S. at 385 & n.2.
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Rizzo misconstrued Congress's intent when it rejected plaintiffs' asser-
tion that they had a right to be protected from police misconduct and
that police department commanders had a corresponding constitutional
duty to see that plaintiffs were protected.
Defenders of the Court's position might argue that the abuses
which caused Congress to pass section 1983 are distinguishable from
the abuses in Philadelphia. During Reconstruction, Congress was con-
cerned with state officials' failure to restrain private violence by the Ku
Klux Klan,30 7 not with State officials' failure to restrain their own sub-
ordinates. Nevertheless, this difference does not justify protecting Phil-
adelphia police supervisors from section 1983 liability for their
subordinates' actions. If state officials can be subjected to section 1983
liability for failing to protect the citizenry from vigilantes, they likewise
can be held accountable for failing to protect the citizenry from state
and municipal employees, who are directly under the officials' control
according to state law.308 Officials' failure to control subordinates thus
fits within Congress's general purposes in enacting section 1983 and the
fourteenth amendment. Moreover, such failure is action "under color
of' state law even more clearly than failure to protect against private
lawlessness.
The Rizzo Court should not have relied on amorphous notions of
federalism to support its decision to decline to exercise federal jurisdic-
tion.309 The constitutional and statutory enactments of the Reconstruc-
tion era wrought permanent changes in the pre-Civil War relationship
between the state and federal governments. To the extent the Younger
doctrine is founded on a conception of federalism that is inconsistent
307. See supra notes 17 1-72 and accompanying text.
308. Under Pennsylvania law, the Managing Director of Philadelphia is responsible for super-
vising the activities of the City's Police Commissioner. The Police Commissioner in turn has
responsibility for supervision and control of the police department. COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F.
Supp. 1289, 1292 (E.D. Pa. 1973), af'dub noma. Goode v. Rizzo 506 F.2d (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423
U.S. 362 (1976); cf. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 673-80 (1978)
(Both opponents and supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 agreed that Congress could im-
pose civil damage liability on a municipality that was obligated to keep the peace under state law
but failed to do so in violation of the fourteenth amendment.).
309. Moreover, it is not even clear in Rizzo that theoretically available state remedies existed.
The district court reviewed both judicial and nonjudicial remedies and found them to be untena-
ble. COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1292-94, 1319-20 (E.D. Pa. 1973), af'd sub nom. Goode
v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Supreme Court never
considered whether alternative state remedies existed. This omission prompted Owen Fiss to
remark:
In striking contrast to [O'Shea v. Littleton], there is no pretense that the federal injunc-
tive remedy is being denied because there is an alternative adequate remedy. The value
preference is more starkly embraced: even if no other remedy is available, the doors of
the federal equity court will be closed.
Fiss, supra note 226, at 1159 (emphasis in original); see also Weinberg, supra note 278, at 1224-25.
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with the fourteenth amendment and concomitant congressional action,
it should be abandoned.
310
D. The Cases Extending Younger to State Civil Proceedings.
Younger, O'Shea, and Rizzo all concerned federal court interven-
tion in state criminal justice systems. During the 1970's, the Supreme
Court extended the Younger doctrine to selected civil cases.31" In
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd ,312 Ohio brought civil actions under its obscen-
ity laws to stop the showing of allegedly obscene movies in a local thea-
ter. After a state court granted an order of abatement, the theater
owner instituted a federal action challenging the obscenity statute. The
Supreme Court ordered abstention, holding that the Younger principles
applied to state civil proceedings when "the State is a party . . . and
the proceeding is both in aid of and closely related to criminal stat-
utes."313 In Juidice v. Vail, 314 Vail was imprisoned briefly for civil con-
tempt after ignoring the orders of a state court in a proceeding brought
to enforce a previous civil judgment. He brought a federal class action
seeking to enjoin operation of the statutory contempt procedures on the
ground that they violated due process. The Supreme Court ordered
abstention, stressing the importance of a "State's interest in the con-
tempt process, through which it vindicates the regular operation of its
310. Instead of abandoning the Younger doctrine, however, the Supreme Court continues to
reinforce it. The Court relied upon O'Shea and Rizzo in ordering dismissal of a section 1983
action that sought to enjoin the use of a dangerous choke hold by members of the Los Angeles
Police Department in situations where the officers were not threatened with immediate physical
harm. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 457 U.S. 1115 (1983). As in O'Shea andfRizzo, the Lyons Court
concluded that the abstention doctrine precludes relief and made no mention of the legislative
history of the Reconstruction enactments. Lyons draws no more support from that history than do
O'Shea and Rizzo.
Much of the Supreme Court majority opinion is devoted to Lyons's supposed lack of standing
to seek injunctive relief. Id at 4426-28. The Court also relied, however, on the Younger doctrine.
Invocation of abstention principles in Lyons is wholly at odds with the intent of Reconstruction
legislators. Lyons alleged that Los Angeles police were brutalizing and in some instances killing
blacks without justification. Racially-motivated beatings and the slaughter of blacks by southern
law enforcement officials and private individuals, and the persistent failure of southern justice
systems to protect against these and other forms of discrimination, were the chief complaints of
the Reconstruction Congresses. See supra notes 85-86, 91, 120, 141-42, 149-51, 170-71 and accom-
panying text. Because the fourteenth amendment and enforcement legislation were passed specifi-
cally to enable the federal courts to reach the sort of official lawlessness alleged in Lyons, Younger
abstention was inappropriate.
311. For commentary on the extension of Younger to civil cases, see generally Aldisert, On
Being Civil to Younger, 11 CONN. L. REV. 181 (1979); Bartels, Avoiding a Conity of Errors: A
Modelfor Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits That "'Interfere" with State Civil Proceedings, 29
STAN. L. REv. 27 (1976).
312. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
313. Id at 604.
314. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
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judicial system. ' 315 Federal court interference with this process, said
the Court, would be" 'an offense to the State's interest ... every bit as
great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding.' "316
Trainor v. Hernandez317 involved state-initiated civil actions to re-
cover welfare payments that the State of Illinois claimed had been ob-
tained through fraud. The defendants in those proceedings brought a
federal action challenging attachment of their assets by the state with-
out notice or other procedural safeguards. The Supreme Court held
that Younger applied because Illinois was a party to the state court ac-
tions, and "[b]oth the suit[s] and the accompanying writ[s] of attach-
ment were brought to vindicate important state policies such as
safeguarding the fiscal integrity of those programs. ' 31 8 Finally, in
Moore v. Sims 3 19 the Supreme Court ordered the federal district court
not to interfere with pending state court proceedings in which the State
of Texas had taken custody of the federal plaintiffs' children to protect
them from alleged child abuse. The Court noted that Texas was a party
to the state proceedings, which were instituted to further a vital state
interest.3
20
Although these four cases were brought pursuant to the fourteenth
amendment and sections 1343 and 1983, the majority opinions never
mention the legislative history of the enactments.32' Reexamination of
315. Id at 335.
316. Id at 336 (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604).
317. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
318. Id at 444. The Court remanded for inquiry into whether the plaintiffs could have
presented their due process challenge in the pending state proceedings. Id at 447-48.
319. 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
320. Id at 423, 435. For a thoughtful analysis of this decision, see Note, Moore v. Sims: A
Further Expansion of the Younger Abstention Doctrine, 1 PACE L. REV. 149 (1980).
321. The dissenting justices, and Justice Brennan in particular, argued that abstention in these
cases was inconsistent with congressional intent. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 437 (1979)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 450, 456 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 616-17 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in Juidice was vehement:
[T]he Court effectively cripples the congressional scheme enacted in § 1983. The crystal
clarity of the congressional decision and purpose in adopting § 1983, and the unbroken
line of this Court's cases enforcing that decision, expose Huffman and today's decision as
deliberate and conscious floutings of a decision Congress was constitutionally empow-
ered to make. It stands the § 1983 remedy on its head to deny the § 1983 plaintiff access
to the federal forum because of the pendency of the state civil proceedings where Con-
gress intended that the district court should entertain his suit without regard to the pen-
dency of the state suit.
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. at 343 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Although elo-
quently stated, Justice Brennan's dissents speak only in general terms about Congress's purposes
and rely primarily on other recent Supreme Court cases. His arguments are strengthened consid-
erably by examining the legislative record in greater detail. Cf. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457
U.S. 496, 502-07 (1982) (detailed examination of legislative history shows Congress did not mean
to require exhaustion of the state administrative remedies in section 1983 actions); Monell v. New
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these decisions in light of the legislative history suggests that applica-
tion of the Younger doctrine was improper. First, if the legislative his-
tory cuts the Younger doctrine off at its roots in the criminal area,
spread of the doctrine to civil cases is unwarranted. In addition, the
debates show that throughout Reconstruction, Congress was deeply
disturbed by the systemic maladministration of civil justice in the
South.322 The Black Codes were enforced by civil as well as criminal
processes.323 In 1865-1866, numerous southern whites instituted civil
suits under the Codes against Army and Freedmen's Bureau person-
nel.324 Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment was enacted primarily
to give Congress the power to reform errant state justice systems, both
civil and criminal;325 most of the numerous enforcement statutes that
Congress passed under this authority sought to ensure equal treatment
in civil matters. 326
A strict interpretivist might argue that the Court was nonetheless
correct to decline federal jurisdiction in Huffman, Juidice, Trainor, and
Moore because the specific claims in those cases were not contemplated
by Reconstruction legislators.327 It is, of course, true that from 1865 to
1871, Congress was not thinking of the unfair deprivation of property
York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665-89 (1978) (detailed examination of legislative
history shows Congress intended municipalities to be persons within meaning of section 1983).
322. See supra notes 151, 171-72, 177 and accompanying text.
323. In South Carolina, for example, no black could be anything other than a farm laborer or
servant without paying a fee and obtaining a license from a judge, and new courts were estab-
lished with exclusive jurisdiction of all civil causes where one or both parties were black. See
supra notes 39, 44 and accompauying text.
324. State and local lawyers, judges, and juries applied the civil sanctions of the Codes against
Army and Bureau personnel for interference with blacks' labor contracts and for other alleged
wrongs.
325. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
326. The Freedmen's Bureau bill would have extended to blacks "the right to make and en-
force contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence. . . and to have full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and estate." See supra text accompanying note 64.
The 1866 Civil Rights Act stated that blacks were to have the same right as whites "to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and
convey real and personal property." See supra text accompanying note 80.
The May 11, 1866 amendments to the 1863 Habeas Corpus and Removal Act made removal
of civil cases from state to federal court easier. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. The
Separable Controversies Act was passed to counter plaintiffs' practice in southern courts ofjoining
a local defendant in suits against northerners to destroy complete diversity and thus prohibit re-
moval to federal court. Id
The debates on the 1871 Civil Rights Act focused on criminal justice reform. Nonetheless, in
discussing section 1983 legislators spoke in terms that encompassed the administration ofjustice
generally, see supra notes 171-72, 177 and accompanying text, and made no attempt to limit sec-
tion 1983 remedies to reform of state criminal justice systems. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
Ist Sess. app. 185 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Platt).
327. See supra note 13.
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of theater owners, imprisonment under unconstitutional civil contempt
procedures, attachment of funds without notice or an opportunity to be
heard in welfare recoupment proceedings, or removal of children from
their parents without a prior hearing.3 28 Instead, Congress was con-
cerned with army and Freedmen's Bureau officials unfairly being held
civilly liable in state courts for aiding freedmen, and with general dis-
crimination and procedural unfairness in state civil suits because of
race, employment status, or political opinion.
Despite the dissimilarities, the nature of the potential state court
problem that the Reconstruction Congresses sought to remedy has not
changed in the intervening century. That state justice systems have not
in the last decade manifested the level of racism, hatred, and bigotry
that marked the post-Civil War era is no guarantee that state systems
will not again become the bastions of such ill will. Indeed, the civil
rights reforms of the 1960's demonstrated how enduring some of these
problems are. The Constitution, and particularly the fourteenth
amendment, is the only safeguard against such abuse. After the Civil
War persons were being deprived of liberty and property without due
process of law, and the deprivations occurred because judges in civil
state court proceedings failed to accord the procedural fairness re-
quired by the Constitution. Viewed in this manner, the exercise of ju-
risdiction in Huffman, Juidice, Trainor, and Moore would have been at
least consistent with legislative intent. Moreover, even an interpretivist
may properly "seek to determine whether a given issue falls within the
scope of evils the framers addressed.
'329
E. Lower Federal Court Decisions.
O'Shea v. Littleton, Rizzo v. Goode, and the civil Younger cases
sent the lower federal courts a clear message: in the future, be ex-
tremely reluctant to order declaratory or injunctive relief that might
interfere with the administration of justice in the states. The lower
courts heard the message, and generally have declined to use their eq-
uitable powers to reform state criminal and civil justice systems. A
sampling of the case law reveals the magnitude of the lower courts'
abdication of their responsibilities under the fourteenth amendment
and sections 1343 and 1983.
328. Congress did consider an analogous child custody problem. The Mississippi Black Code
required local officials to report to probate courts all black children whose parents could not sup-
port them so that they could be apprenticed to a suitable person. See supra note 38 and accompa-
nying text. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, presumably overturned this provision.
329. See Grano, supra note 233, at 18.
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In the criminal justice area, the lower federal courts have dis-
missed section 1983 cases alleging improper police conduct,330 delays in
arraignment,33' unconstitutional bail practices, 332 coercion of guilty
pleas, 333 denial of the right to counsel,334 inadequate representation by
counsel,335 denial of speedy trial,336 unconstitutional procedures for se-
lecting petit and grand jurors,337 failure to provide transcripts to indi-
gent defendants, 338 unconstitutional practices in the conduct of trials,339
330. See, e.g., Robinson v. Stovall, 473 F. Supp. 135, 143-47 (N.D. Miss. 1979) (Younger bars
suit against city officials to enjoin brutal treatment and intimidation pursuant to unconstitutional
ordinance banning demonstrations), af'd in part and rev'd in part, 646 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1981).
331. See, e.g., Dommer v. Crawford, 638 F.2d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 1980) (Younger bars class
action seeking injunction ordering state officials to comply with state law requiring arraignment
before magistrate within twenty-four hours of arrest), withdrawn and amended opinion issued, 653
F.2d 289, 291 (7th Cir. 1981). Butsee Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073, 1081 (3d Cir. 1972)
(Younger no bar to suit challenging intake procedures and lack of preliminary hearings in Phila-
delphia Family Court).
332. See, e.g., Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981) (Younger doctrine bars suit
by defendants in state criminal proceedings claiming imposition of excessive bail); Rivera v. Free-
man, 469 F.2d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 1972) (Younger bars challenge to California statutes governing
detention ofjuveniles). But see Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1154 (8th Cir. 1981) (Younger does
not bar challenge to section of Nebraska constitution denying bail to persons charged with certain
sex offenses), vacated as moot sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) (per curiam).
333. See, e.g., Bonner v. Circuit Court, 526 F.2d 1331, 1335-38 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (fed-
eral court should abstain in suit by black state criminal defendants alleging that judges, prosecu-
tors, and defense lawyers had joined in a systematic, racially-motivated conspiracy to coerce guilty
pleas), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 946 (1976).
334. See, e.g., Williams v. Rubiera, 539 F.2d 470, 473-75 (5th Cir. 1976) (Younger bars chal-
lenge by defendant in pending state prosecution for welfare fraud who wants counsel assigned,
even though fine is only possible sentence), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 931 (1977); Bedrosian v. Mintz,
518 F.2d 396, 399-400 (2d Cir. 1975) (federal court should not direct state judge to appoint out-of-
state counsel requested by defendant in criminal prosecution). But see Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d 874,
879-82 (6th Cir. 1978) (federal district court could enjoin state judge from barring out-of-state
counsel in criminal case because counsel had no adequate alternative means to challenge the state
court order), rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
335. See, e.g., Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 1974) (Younger barred class suit
by convicted state prisoners challenging representation of Florida Public Defender), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 841 (1975); Wallace v. Kern (I), 481 F.2d 621, 622 (2d Cir. 1973) (federal court refused on
comity grounds to limit caseloads of Legal Aid attorneys), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
336. See, e.g., Wallace v. Kern (II), 499 F.2d 1345, 1351 (2d Cir. 1974) (Younger barred in-
junction setting time limits for commencement of state trials and requiring release of defendants
on recognizance for noncompliance), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975).
337. See, e.g., Diaz v. Stathis, 576 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1978) (Younger doctrine precludes suit
by defendants and a plaintiff in pending state criminal and civil proceedings seeking injunctive
relief reforming discriminatory state procedures for picking petit and grand jurors); Bryant v.
Morgan, 451 F.2d 354, 355 (5th Cir. 1971) (Younger bars constitutional attack on trial jury selec-
tion procedures by persons under indictment in state court). But see Ciudadanos Unidos de San
Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury Comm'rs, 622 F.2d 807, 830 n.49 (5th Cir. 1980) (Younger no
bar to class action by community residents seeking prospective injunctive relief against discrimi-
natory grand jury selection procedures), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 964 (1981); Penn v. Eubanks, 360 F.
Supp. 699, 702 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (same).
338. See, e.g., Leslie v. Matzkin, 450 F.2d 310, 312 (2d Cir. 1971) (Younger doctrine precludes
suit seeking to compel Connecticut officials to provide indigent defendants with copies of prelimi-
nary hearing transcripts in advance of trial), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
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and improper mental hospital assignment policies.34° In the civil jus-
tice area, the lower federal courts have declined to exercise their juris-
diction in section 1983 cases seeking to overturn a state court injunction
prohibiting demonstrations protesting racial discrimination,341 to en-
sure procedural fairness in state proceedings to revoke a driver's li-
cense, 342 and to enjoin professional disciplinary procedures on due
process grounds.343 Courts have also declined to hear section 1983
cases brought by plaintiffs challenging a state rule of civil procedure
adding damages against defendants for delay in civil cases,344 attacking
municipal ordinances governing eminent domain procedures, 345 and
seeking to require a state to provide adequate facilities for the proper
functioning of the civil and criminal justice systems.
346
As with the Supreme Court cases that they mimic, these lower
court decisions find little support in the legislative history of Recon-
struction. The practices complained about in at least some of the cases
cited above are virtually identical to the evils that prompted the Recon-
struction enactments. For example, police brutality and failure to pro-
vide protection, discriminatory bail practices, and failure of judges to
accord procedural fairness in the conduct of trials were all specifically
objected to by Reconstruction legislators. 347 The challenged proce-
339. See, e.g., Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 2 (6th Cir. 1980) (Younger bars class action charg-
ing state juvenile court judges with denying basic due process in civil contempt proceedings
against indigent fathers behind in support payments); New Jersey v. Chesimard, 555 F.2d 63, 68
(3d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Younger precludes suit by defendant in pending state criminal proceed-
ing seeking to enjoin state court from holding trial on Friday, Muslim holy day); Manns v.
Koontz, 451 F.2d 1344, 1345 (4th Cir. 1971) (Younger bars challenge to state law placing exclusive
jurisdiction of criminal case in domestic relations court that does not afford jury trial).
340. See, e.g., Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364, 1371-72 (8th Cir. 1980) (Younger doctrine bars
class suit challenging Arkansas mental hospital policy of assigning criminal defendants to maxi-
mum security wards while assigning other involuntarily committed persons to open wards, and
challenging commitment and release procedures).
341. See, e.g., Blue v. Revels, 441 F. Supp. 308, 311-12 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
342. See, e.g., Sartin v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 535 F.2d 430, 433-34 (8th Cir. 1976)
(Younger bars suit challenging racial discrimination by police and revocat ion of license without
due process); United States ex rel Hudson v. Wollenzien, 345 F. Supp. 436, 438 (E.D. Wis. 1972)
(court cited Younger in dismissing suit seeking declaratory judgment that plaintiff is entitled to a
jury trial on the issue of the reasonableness of his refusal to submit to blood alcohol test in pro-
ceedings brought to suspend his driving privileges).
343. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Association of the Bar, 515 F.2d 427, 432-34 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 889 (1972); Del Rio v. Kavanagh, 441 F. Supp. 220, 224 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
344. See Insurance Fed'n v. Supreme Court, 489 F. Supp. 89, 93 (E.D. Pa. 1980), a 'd, 669
F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1982).
345. See Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1975).
346. Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Admin. v. Massachusetts, 488 F.2d 1241, 1246 (1st Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).
347. See supra notes 85-86, 91, 93-94, 106-09, 149-51, 161-63, 170-77 and accompanying text.
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dures in many of the other cases in which the lower federal courts have
declined to intervene are very similar to the unfair practices Congress
addressed. Denial of counsel, denial of speedy trial, failure to provide
transcripts, and failure to provide procedural fairness in civil cases in-
volving property or liberty interests all involve systemic deprivations of
due process or equal protection of the same quality and kind that moti-
vated the Reconstruction Congresses to act. It is, of course, possible,
and perhaps even likely, that if the federal courts had heard these cases,
they would have found for the defendants or granted only limited re-
lief. But to assume the truth of the plaintiffs' claims, as the federal
courts must on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,348 and then to refuse to hear them, is wholly
unwarranted given the legislative history.
349
It can be argued that because the fourteenth amendment and the
enforcement acts were aimed at problems in the South immediately
following the Civil War, it is inappropriate to use them as the basis of a
348. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
349. The Supreme Court cases refusing to require exhaustion of state judicial or administra-
tive remedies in section 1983 actions lend support to the thesis that federal courts should intervene
in circumstances that have recently been held to fall within Younger's purview. See Patsy v.
Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63 n.10 (1979); Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S.. 564, 574 (1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671 (1972); Wilwording v.
Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968); Damico v.
California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-83 (1961). In Patsy, 457 U.S.
at 502-07, the Court carefully reviewed the debates of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, and cited many of
the legislative remarks discussed in part I of this Article in support of its holding that exhaustion
of administrative remedies should not be required in section 1983 cases. Georgia Patsy alleged
that her employer, Florida International University, discriminated on grounds of race and sex in
denying her employment opportunities. The Fifth Circuit required her to exhaust available ad-
ministrative remedies, Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 913-14 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
rev'd, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court pointed to three themes in
the legislative debates to support its refusal to impose an exhaustion requirement. First, "Con-
gress assigned to the federal courts a paramount role in protecting constitutional rights" when it
passed section 1 of the Civil Rights Act. 457 U.S. at 503. Second, a major motivating factor in
enacting section I was distrust of the state courts. Id at 505. Third, legislators explicitly inter-
preted section 1 as providing concurrent federal and state court forums, "enabling the plaintiff to
choose the forum in which to seek relief." Id at 506.
The same legislative history that compels the conclusion that Congress did not mean to re-
quire exhaustion of state remedies in section 1983 cases demonstrates even more clearly that Con-
gress did not mean to require federal courts to abstain in Younger-type cases. Indeed, if Congress
rejected exhaustion, which contemplates a possible return to federal court if state remedies are
unavailing, it also must have rejected abstention, which bars the doors to the lower federal courts
completely. Justice Powell recognized the inconsistency of Younger and the exhaustion cases in
his dissenting opinion: "[A] categorical no-exhaustion rule would seem inconsistent with the deci-
sion in Younger v. Harris. . . prescribing abstention when state criminal proceedings are pend-
ing. At least where administrative proceedings are pending, Younger would seem to suggest the
appropriateness of exhaustion." Id at 533-34 (citation omitted). Equally, of course, non-exhaus-
tion cases such as Patsy suggest the inappropriateness of Younger abstention.
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nationwide litigation campaign to work systemic reform in state justice
systems in the 1970's and 1980's. It is difficult, however, to argue credi-
bly that the fourteenth amendment and section 1983 apply only to the
South or that their provisions have somehow expired or lost force with
the passage of time. Nor can it seriously be contended that constitu-
tional provisions or broad remedial statutes are limited in scope to the
precise events that caused their enactment.350
In addition, it seems particularly appropriate to apply the Recon-
struction measures to remedy modem deficiencies in the administration
of justice because the modem problems can be attributed, in part, to
the heritage of slavery.35' Racism and poverty contribute to the over-
whelming caseloads that are responsible for many of the denials of due
process and equal protection in state justice systems.352 Therefore, fed-
eral courts ought to use the Reconstruction enactments to help solve
problems directly descended from the injustices of that Era.
353
350. Reed Dickerson has stated:
Although legislation is usually prompted by specific past situations, legislative draftsmen
almost inevitably address their words to classes of events. . . . [T]o deny that the legis-
lator's utterance of general conditions on future behavior is a proper part of the legisla-
tive function is to deny that guidance and the establishment of workable frames of
reference on which reasonable expectations can be built are among the functions of the
legal order.
Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: A Peek Into the Mind and Will of a Legislature, 50 IND. L.J.
206, 215 (1975).
351. R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 61-62 (1970).
352. See generally L. KATz, L. LITWIN, & R. BAMGERGER, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME: PRE-TRIAL
DELAY IN FELONY CASES (1972); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
353. Federal suits seeking systemic reform of state justice systems typically are brought as
class actions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) and (2). Although courts of equity of the Reconstruc-
tion era could entertain class actions, there were many restrictions on their use. See generally Z.
CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 199-224 (1950) (origins and development of class suits);
Developments in the Law--Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1318, 1331-37 (1976) (community of
interest as prerequisite for class suit). Chief among these restrictions was the rule that class suits
could be brought only on behalf of persons holding "a common interest or a common right" and
not on behalf of those holding several and distinct rights. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.)
288, 302 (1854); see also Ayres v. Carver, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 591, 594 (1855). This requirement
presumably precluded most class suits by groups of blacks under Reconstruction legislation. Be-
cause Reconstruction legislators could not have foreseen development of the modem class action,
it might be argued that the legislative history does not support the use of this flexible and powerful
device to reform state practices and procedures.
There is no reason, however, to think that Congress would have wanted the federal courts to
retain outmoded procedural rules, or would have denied the courts the opportunity to adopt more
modem procedures as they evolved over time. A contrary intent can be seen in the passage of the
Conformity Act in 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196 (1872). The Conformity Act directed the federal
courts, in actions at law, to conform their procedures to those "existing at the time in like causes in
the courts of record of the State within which such circuit or district courts are held." Id. at 197.
This "dynamic" conformity replaced the earlier "static" conformity that had required the federal
courts to follow state procedures as of a given date. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION 668-72 (2d ed.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Congress's primary concerns during Reconstruction were the stub-
born problems of violence and the maladministration of justice in the
South. Congress's primary goals in passing the fourteenth amendment
and remedial statutes of that era were to eradicate discriminatory laws
and to assure due process and equal protection in state criminal and
civil justice systems. The Congress empowered the federal courts to
accomplish these goals, and granted access to a federal forum to the
victims of these injustices.
In the 1970's, the federal courts ignored this mandate. The courts'
abdication is not without cost. As Harry H. Wellington has noted,
a governmental structure that fails to unite a nation's present with its
past necessarily fails to preserve values to which its citizens may at-
tach considerable weight. It fails to make a contemporary effort to
understand what we have been or have wished as a people to be-
come, and thus it fails to give effect to what might be called the moral
ideals of the community.
354
Over 100 years have passed since Reconstruction, but due process and
equal protection in state criminal and civil justice systems remain un-
realized goals. When state justice systems fail to protect fundamental
rights, it is time for the federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction.
1973). Moreover, Congress had given the Supreme Court broad rulemaking authority in equity
actions. See Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 188,5 Stat. 516, 518;see also HART & WECHSLER, supra, at
664-65 (court rulemaking power reaffirmed by Act of August 23, 1842).
In addition, in seeking systemic reform of southern justice systems, the Reconstruction Con-
gresses authorized the federal courts to use virtually every remedy available at that time. See
supra section I. It is thus possible, and perhaps even likely, that the legislators would have heart-
ily approved the current Federal Rule 23, and would have adopted it had they thought of it. For
an excellent discussion of the history of the class action, see Yeazell, From Group Litigants to Class
Action Part P The Industrialization of Group Litigation, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 514 (1980); Yeazell,
From Group Litigation to Class Action Part II" Interest, Class, and Representation, 27 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 1067 (1980).
354. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 494 (1982).
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